A POSITIVIST PRIMER:

C. G. DAVID.

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POSITIVIST PRIMER:

BEING A SERIES OF

FAMILIAR CONVERSATIONS

ON THE

RELIGION OF HUMANITY.

BY C. G. DAVID.

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David Goodman Brolly.

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Dedication.

TO

THE ONLY SUPREME BEING MAN CAN EVER KNOW,

THE GREAT BUT IMPERFECT GOD,

HUMANITY,

IN WHOSE IMAGE ALL OTHER GODS WERE MADE,

AND FOR WHOSE SERVICE ALL OTHER GODS EXIST,

AND TO WHOM ALL THE CHILDREN OF MEN OWE

LABOR, LOVE, AND WORSHIP.

PREFACE.

To meet a want long felt, I have ventured to compose and publish this volume in the hope that it might help to familiarize American students with the writings of Auguste Comte and his French and English disciples.

This is the first short essay which attempts to explain, in a popular way, the much misunderstood Religion of Humanity. I am painfully conscious of the many defects of this volume, but my object will have been accomplished if I can succeed in attracting attention to a subject which I know is of the very highest human importance. The Conversations which follow were actual utterances, taken down by a stenographer, and but slightly altered in copy. The style is not as compact as if the "pen steadied the mind" during composition, but its informal character may help, perhaps, to make the subject understandable to plain people. Those who believe as I do, are firmly convinced that Positivism is the most important subject which can now engage the attention of human beings. It affords a solution—and, as we think, the only solution—of nearly all the problems now puzzling and distracting the race. For every question in Religion, Morality, and the relations of life it has an answer. It treats of God, Immortality, Duty, the Woman, the Labor, and the Government questions, from the standpoint of the latest revelations of science. Those interested are invited to circulate this work.

C. G. DAVID.

A POSITIVIST PRIMER.

CONVERSATION FIRST.

Querist. I have come to obtain some information respecting what is known as Positivism, and do so because I understand that you in some way represent the religious element of the Positive school in this country.

Positivist. Temporarily, I do. Just at present I am the *nexus* between the American body of religious Positivists and the European body—not because of any special fitness for propagating the doctrine, but for a certain business reason; nor am I the best exponent of the Religion of Humanity on this continent. It has other disciples who have paid far more attention to it, stated it better, and could give a clearer exposition of its doctrines than I could hope to do. There may, however, be an advantage in the re-statement of the Positivist creed by one who is himself a student, in that he may be best able to solve doubts in the minds of persons who are just learning the first principles of the new faith. The well-grounded disciple would be apt to take too much for granted; would, in the plenitude of his convictions, forget that premises were required to attain his conclusions, and that they will be necessary for other students.

Querist. What do you mean by Positivism?

Positivist. In the language of Auguste Comte, "the word 'Positive' will be understood to mean *relative* as much as it now means *organic*, *precise*, *certain*, *useful*, and *real*." The religious systems which have heretofore ob-

tained have not had those characteristics. Our faith is, however, based upon demonstrated truths, not upon authority or tradition, or mere subjective conceptions, but upon objective realities which can be seen and known of all men.

Querist. Is there any necessity for a new faith?

Positivist. It is our belief that there never has been and never can be more than one real religion of man, and that all previous religions have, in some sense, been true to this conception. That is to say, any religion which satisfies the wants of humanity must have had some relation to human nature, and must have been so far true. We conceive it to be the business of the science of the age to find out what is permanent and what transient in the various religious theories which have heretofore obtained upon this earth. Max Müller's studies on comparative theology have been in the right direction. The difficulty so far with modern science and criticism is that it has been destructive. It has shown the falsehood of some of the primary conceptions of the old faiths. Sad havoc has been made with Christianity by the criticisms of Strauss, Renan, and other exemplars of the German and French schools, while modern science has discredited the cosmology and intellectual conceptions upon which the Christian faith has been founded. Conscientious men in the ministry, or who belong to the several churches, are nowadays sorely afflicted by the irreconcilable statements made respectively by their creeds and by the revelations of modern science.

Querist. You do not believe, then, that there can be any reconciliation between religion and science?

Positivist. Oh, yes! True religion is founded upon science, but there can be no reconciliation between modern science and the old theologies now taught in our churches. It is idle for ministers and church publications to depre-

cate any contest between science and the religion they teach, because the attitude of modern thought is undeniably adverse to nearly all the dogmas taught in the Christian Church.

Querist. To begin at the beginning, has this religion, or faith, of Positivism any conception of Deity?

Positivist. All Positivists believe in a Supreme Being, and yet that statement needs explanation. We do not believe in the God of the Jew, the Mohammedan, or the Christian. We do not believe in a First Cause. We do not believe in an author of nature. We do not believe in an infinite and an absolute God. Our God is a relative God, is a demonstrable God—an imperfect God. In short, our Supreme Being is Humanity, which we affirm is the only God man ever could or ever can know. In other words, all conceptions of Deity are anthropomorphic, are simply projections out into infinite space of notions incident to human nature. Emerson says, "To know God we must be Gods," which is true. It is obvious that the loftiest conception of Deity we can have is necessarily purely human. We affirm that modern science has taken all past conceptions of Deity, has put them in a crucible, and after the gases have been driven off and the dross burned out in the fire of criticism, all the pure metal which has been found remaining is Humanity,—nothing more.

Querist. From the reading of John Stuart Mill, and other critics of Auguste Comte, I have been led to believe that Positivism had no God.

Positivist. Yes; great injustice has been done our belief by identifying us with atheists. As Comte himself stated it, "Atheists are the most inconsistent of theologians." If we must have a theory to account for the universe as it is presented to our senses, the Theistic conception is undeniably the most rational. We, of course, on philosophical grounds, reject peremptorily all consider-

ation of insoluble problems—of a knowledge of things in themselves, of First or Final causes. We do not look "through nature up to nature's God," for nature, when interrogated, gives us no answer.

Querist. In this you run counter to the popular notion, as well as the argument from design to prove the existence of a Creator?

Positivist. We can not help that. The difficulty is that people conceive of creation as of a straight line, with a beginning and an end, whereas a more accurate mental impression would be that of a circle, without beginning or end. This conception is familiar to the scientists, because the chemists long ago discovered that so far as our senses or our knowledge went, matter is indestructible. You can not get rid of it by any process known to us. If it disappears in one shape, it re-appears in another. It is an axiom of science that no atom of matter can be lost, and therefore it is and must, so far as human thought can go, have been practically eternal. The most recent and fertile generalization of science with regard to forces is, that they, too, are indestructible. The doctrine of the co-relation of forces is that arrested motion, heat, light, electricity, and magnetism are convertible forces, quantitatively, and are perhaps modifications of some one force, the nature of which is, to us, unknown. I will not go into the subtilties of these definitions farther than to state, in general effect, that, so far as our faculties give us any knowledge, matter and force are indestructible—live forever,—and that it is absurd to speak of a Creator when there is no creation, or of a First Cause when the effect has always existed. Still, it is equally unphilosophical to deny that an absolute and infinite God exists, for our position is that we know nothing about it. If, in the farther progress of the race, such a Being should be demonstrated to our reason, we would be bound to accept the absolute and infinite God, but

modern science rigidly excludes all conceptions of the infinite and absolute as not being within the scope of our powers, but to us simply inconceivable.

Querist. You do not, then, make an object of worship of this Deity, this infinite and absolute but unknowable God?

Positivist. Certainly not. It is here that we separate ourselves from the school of Mr. Herbert Spencer. An unknowable God, as an object of worship, seems to us preposterous. If he is unknown, why, there is an end of it, so far as we are concerned. Our object of worship is the Supreme Being from whom all these vague conceptions have been derived. We, conscious of will, of ability to act upon the world about us, have very naturally imagined that the universe was molded into shape by a great Supreme will; but Darwinism, or rather the general scientific movement of which Darwinism is, up to this time, the culmination, shows us that all the harmonies of the universe can be satisfactorily accounted for without the interposition of any creative will or First Cause whatever. Indeed, it is the mission of modern science to account for things as they are, and to get rid of all conceptions of their evolution from an infinite will.

Querist. Is there any harm in people believing in the old version of God?

Positivist. We think there is, a very great deal of harm. Primarily, its tendency is to relax the sense of human responsibility. The notion of a Divine Providence ordering the ends of man is a perpetual damper upon human effort. The only Providence we know, or can know, is a Human Providence. What seems to us the marvelous adjustments of matter in the world about us, the forms of beauty by which we are surrounded, are proved to have been brought about by natural agencies in which no trace of outside interference or evidence of the influence of crea-

tive will can be detected. We are constantly "putting the cart before the horse" in seeing an intelligent will impenetrating the world of matter about us. The only will we can know anything about is human will, and these anthropomorphic conceptions bedevil us on every side. Nothing seems clearer to our senses than that the sun moves from east to west, yet the fact is that it is the world which moves from west to east.

Querist. You have spoken of Human Providence,—now in what way can that affect our life or action upon this globe?

Positivist. In every way. All that is of value to us upon this globe has been brought about by human activity acting upon its material environment. The earth has been partially subdued, institutions created, political organization formed, and, more than all, whatever we are as sentient beings, has been created for us by our ancestors. We are not exactly what our immediate parents were, but what the whole past of humanity—including in that term those nearest to humanity among the lower animals, so called—have made us. It is to humanity in the past that we are indebted for everything, and our highest conception of duty is that we should do as much for our descendants as our ancestors have done for us. Hence, we get this idea of a human Providence, the only Providence, as I have already said, of which we can know anything, and the one which ever has us in its holy keeping. For some time people have realized that it was wicked and unreasonable to charge upon an unknown God those evils which it was in our own power to remedy. War, slavery, licentiousness, and disease, all forms of human ill, are clearly within the power of humanity itself to mitigate if not to entirely get rid of. If an infinite and all-powerful God really did rule the universe, he must be the fiend which early conceptions thought him to be, if he permitted so

much suffering to exist when it was in his power, by his Almighty will, to put an end to it. The anthropomorphic character of the old God is shown by the varied phases he has assumed to humanity. The Jehovah of the Jew was a fiend, revengeful, vain, lustful, greedy, covetous, proud,—a very fair illustration of Jewish character as presented to us in Bible history. The God of the Christian is an essentially different being, the merciful, loving Father; but, be it remarked, that no matter what phases the Deity has assumed, his attributes are always of a human type. Our highest notion of Deity, after all, is our highest conception of humanity, that in which the tender, loving, and beneficent emotions have the controlling influence.

Querist. You spoke just now of Herbert Spencer. As he also claims to be a scientist, how is it that he differs so widely in his conceptions from the followers of Auguste Comte?

Positivist. In analyzing the God or Gods which have come down to us, two entirely different kinds of conceptions were encountered. In the first place, to him were attributed all human emotions. Not a passion, nor an appetite, nor a sentiment which is known to the human race but has been ascribed to the various Gods which men have made in their own image to rule over their lives. But, in the conception of Deity, with these purely human attributes, there were other fantasies of the Infinite and the Absolute which modern science, in all the schools, has discovered are wholly alien to humanity. The now universally accepted doctrine of relativity of knowledge teaches us that it is impossible to know the infinite or the absolute. This is the verdict of orthodox philosophy as illustrated by Sir William Hamilton and Dean Mansel, as well as by the heterodox science of Herbert Spencer and the school of John Stuart Mill. Curiously enough, Comte, who made

the same analysis as Spencer, fixed upon the human part of the God-conception for his Supreme Being, while Herbert Spencer formulated the unknowable infinite and absolute conception as the great mystery which man was always to worship. We are quite willing to leave the decision to the scientific world in the future as to which conception of Deity is of the most value to us in our life upon this planet. We find that the only use of any worship, or, as we prefer to call it, "cultus," is that it serves humanity—that it gives us a morality which tends to make this world somewhat better than we found it—that by the inculcation of a higher knowledge of and love for humanity it improves our conditions of life; but we can not find that worshiping an unknown and invisible, or an absolute and infinite God, will help us at all in this life, and that to be of any value our *cultus* must do something toward serving our fellow-men.

Querist. Can you prove the existence of your Supreme Deity?

Positivist. Certainly we can. It is with us an objective fact, as well as a subjective idealization. The Christian tells us he does not need any evidence of his God, he feels Him in his heart. Well, he is right. His God is in his heart; but he is nowhere else. In other words, his consciousness of Deity is a purely subjective conception; it is in his mind, but has no existence of its own out of or apart from his mind. The intuitionists, as they are called, those who look inside themselves to discover truth, can imagine anything, and not being trammeled by facts, can believe anything. Swedenborg made use of this introspective vision and discovered a whole world of angels and demons, of heavens and hells. His dreams were true enough as subjective conceptions,—they were true to him,—but they had no objective reality. He was simply insane, and, like all insane persons, intensely subjective. The lunatic in-

disputably sees as realities to him, the things which present themselves to his imagination, but outside his mind their reality has no existence, and hence all beliefs which have no objective basis outside ourselves are so far mere insane imaginings, true as subjective conceptions, but untrue if judged in the light of the realities of the world about us. Now, humanity indisputably exists. We see its evidences all about us, and the abstract conception we form of humanity is as true as the abstract conception we have always had of the church, the state, the nation, the town or city, or of any aggregation of human beings with which our common conceptions and common language make us so familar. But, here understand me, while Humanity, as we see it, is made of up of the individuals which form the bulk of the population of the globe, it means more than this. Comte's symbol of Humanity was a woman with a child in her arms, representing at once the past, the present, and the future. Oxygen and hydrogen go to form water, but water is something more than oxygen and hydrogen, is indeed something very different. So humanity, as we conceive it, is not a mere aggregation of the human beings now upon the globe. Our Supreme Being has had a past and will have a future, as well as a present. Indeed we, in our forms, emotions, and activities, represent far more of the past than we do of the present. All who have served humanity, who have worked with it and for it, are still part of this Great Being. Humanity can never get rid of its past—nor is humanity perfect; but it is constantly growing better, constantly improving, and its future will be as much more glorious than its present as its present is superior to its past, and that this may be accomplished, depends entirely upon the willing activities of those who now form the visible side of her existence. I have dwelt somewhat upon this conception, because it is of vital importance to a correct understanding of our be-

lief. No religion can make any headway without its Supreme Being. We can prove, we can demonstrate our Supreme Being, our God, as an objective reality, as well as a subjective conception. All other gods are mere figments of the imagination; ours is the great reality, the only verity; the rest are dreams or types. So far, we have been disposed to treat, with great consideration, the faiths of those who still cling to the old idea of God, because that has, in its day, been of immense service to humanity in bridging over the chasm from its brute to its human life. But it has now got to be mischievous,—it is in the way, it is a check to progress. There is, it is true, some difficulty in presenting humanity in its proper light, because it requires art to be brought into play to give it an individual and vital existence to men's imaginations. Science can only indicate, but can not embody the true God. It requires art to vivify the conception, the knowledge, rather, which science gives us, that men may see and know our Supreme Being; and we invoke the aid of the poet and the artist of the future to help us to show mankind their true and only God, that God in whom we "live, move, and have our being."

Querist. Does your religion involve a ritual?

Positivist. Certainly; and the noblest and most elaborate of which the human mind can conceive. It is our intention to use all the resources of art in magnifying the Deity we worship,—the fair Humanity; all the effect and grandeur that music can lend to our praise, all that art can do by statuary and painting to elevate our conceptions and ennoble our ideals, all that poesie can do to enkindle our imaginations, all will be used to adorn and glorify and magnify the Being to whom we owe everything, our whole service and our whole heart.

Querist. The popular conception of a scientific religion would be a very cold and heartless affair,—a religion sim-

ply of the intellect, an argumentative religion,—a religion of formulæ and demonstration, as one might say, a methodical thing involving mathematical proof by curves and lines and algebraic signs.

Positivist. Yes; well, our religion includes all that, but far more. One of the cardinal principles of our great teacher was that the intellect must be subordinated to the heart. The affections were, from his point of view, the highest part of humanity, and all imagination and fancy—the soul of all that portion of our being which tends to aspiration and the ennoblement of the race—should cluster round this great conception. This is, of all religions, the most emotional, as it is, of all religions, the most intellectual and scientific. Of course it is, as yet, known only to men of thought in its severer aspects. The class of minds which have been attracted to it so far have been those in whom the nobler emotions did not have free play; but in its full fruition Positivism will be the most emotional of all religions, and will depend more upon art for its presentation than it does upon science, although the intellectual conceptions upon which it is based will still be demonstrable by the known methods of science.

CONVERSATION SECOND.

Querist. How about immortality? If we die, shall we live again?

Positivist. To that I would answer Yes and No. So far as we *know*, man has no personal immortality. From that bourne no traveler has returned; yet there is a real immortality for man, both objective and subjective. The materials which go to compose his body are of course eternal. So far as human faculties reach in knowledge of the laws of nature, every material atom of which he is composed lives forever. The forces to which he gives birth, or which pass through him from the past into the future, are also eternal. He lives in his work of good or evil. We may view man as a steam-engine. The fuel that is put into him, the germs of power, sets a force in motion which works on forever. Hence the value of a good and well-spent life, the conservation of our forces for the highest human uses. Man has therefore a real subjective immortality in the life of the race, purged of all grossness, free from all selfishness. You remember the story of the Hindoo sage whose wife asked him if he should live hereafter. He held up before her a piece of salt. "See," said he, "I throw this salt into the river. It disappears, but nevertheless the salt lives on. It is not destroyed. Only the form is gone." This is the Positivist conception of immortality,—the substance lives forever, but the form changes. The individuality is lost in the great flood of time, but all that is valuable in that personality can never die. Death, with us, is but a change, a getting rid of the old encumbrance, an entering into a new and higher life.

Querist. But surely this is not a satisfactory doctrine to

those who are looking for a personal immortality hereafter?

Positivist. We can not help that. Nothing but our own personal selfishness, the love of our individuality, warrants us in expecting a personal life hereafter. The moral conception which lies at the base of Positivism is that we must not live for ourselves, but for others. The true Positivist regards the current doctrine of immortality as profoundly immoral. It puts before every human being the notion that the life hereafter is the only worthy ideal to live and strive for. To us Positivists it is the meanest conception that one can have—that embodied in the words, "What profiteth it a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?"—thus making the individual good the prime object of life. According to our morality, the individual good is a very secondary consideration. It is the good of all, of the race, and not of the individual, that is the supreme good—in other words, the good of humanity rather than one of the cells of which the Great Being is composed. The practical results of this doctrine of personal immortality, as preached in our churches, is to transfer to an illusory world all those aspirations, those hopes of perfectibility, which we should attempt to realize upon this earth, the only world of which we really know anything. When men live for a state of existence which is illusory—when all their hopes are placed there—they are apt to neglect the duties which lie close to their hands, and such consideration of personality makes egoism the great object of existence. Froude, the historian, in a remarkable essay on Progress, published recently, points out the evil of this doctrine of personal immortality. The old Egyptians believed in it, and the result was the extreme debasement of the great mass of the people. They imagined a recompense for the misery in which they were compelled to dwell on this globe, in an assurance

that after they had passed away they should live in peace forever. Their hard taskmasters satisfied their consciences by giving these poor creatures a hope of an hereafter as an offset to denying them all natural justice in this life. In this connection, as the words have been used, it may be well to define here what we deem "morality," and what "immorality." Mr. Darwin, in the third chapter of his "Descent of Man," very clearly indicates the basis of human morality. He but repeats, however, what Auguste Comte had pointed out many years before he wrote. Immorality, is living for yourself—morality, living for others. Hence any doctrine which makes your own good the supreme good, your own happiness the supreme happiness, is profoundly immoral. This is why we are at issue with the utilitarian school—the "greatest-happiness" school—as well as with the Christian moralists, who build all their hopes upon a future and unreal state of existence in which we are, according to them, to have our rewards for the deeds done in the body; the former molds all our actions for the present attainment of selfish ends, and is, therefore, still more immoral than the latter, which curbs present selfishness for its complete satisfaction in an illusory future. The only heaven that we recognize is the heaven that can be realized on this earth by intelligent human effort. Our "Golden Age" is not in the past, but in the future; the "Gardens of Hesperides" are in the west, toward which we are always marching.

Querist. What is the chief distinction between Positivism and the older faiths?

Positivist. While Positivism embraces all that is valuable in the older religions, its most marked characteristic is its secularity. It is a Religion of Humanity, and its distinctive feature, as such, is in having a polity, or an answer to all the questions which affect man's life on this planet. Secularism has been defined as "this-world-ism,"

in contradistinction to the object of all other religions, which was to prepare man for a life hereafter, a wholly illusory or, at best, a doubtful conception. Christianity has no polity; it aims to prepare man for another state of existence, and it confessedly regards this world as a vale of tears, as a mere place of preparation for the better life hereafter.

Querist. You profess to see a value in all previous forms of faith,—has not this conception, therefore, been of some value to the race?

Positivist. Certainly. In the wretched state in which man has been compelled to live for generations, his hard struggle with material necessities and with his own fearful illusions, it was some consolation for his bitter lot that he could look to a life hereafter, in which he should have the satisfaction of all his nobler emotions without the cares and griefs of mortal existence. This was the value, and the only value, of the conception of a personal immortality; that a race or nation in a condition of physical misery should have an illusion strong enough to support it against the ills of life.

Querist. You speak of "illusions;" let me understand exactly what you mean by your use of that word?

Positivist. Recent researches in natural history go to show that man differs in nothing, essentially, from the brute; that even his so-called higher emotions—gratitude, conscience, fancy, imagination, a sense of beauty—he shares in common with some very inferior orders of animals. What seems to be the most distinguishing mark of humanity is the apparent reality to man of subjective illusions or imaginings which dominate his whole material life, some of them of the most fearful character. Lecky's powerful statement of the universal belief in demons and witchcraft shows how terribly real have been these hideous subjective conceptions. One of the most evident

marks of progress in our day is the getting rid of those frenzied idealizations which in past times made the lives of sentient beings miserable. Spiritualism we are apt to regard as a disease, of which mankind is slowly but surely getting cured. All the way up from savagery man has been haunted by self-created terrors and hallucinations, the natural concomitants of his ignorance. In modern times they assume a much milder form, but they are still, now as then, subjective illusions, having no basis in fact or in the objective world, but merely evidences of the tremendous force of purely mental impressions uncorrected by any reference to objective facts.

Querist. Do I understand you, then, that the old conceptions of God and immortality, and the belief in spirits, now so prevalent in some modern nations, is akin to the illusions of the fetichists and believers in sorcery and witchcraft?

Positivist. Such is my belief. Comte, in his famous "Law of the Three States," accounts historically for the condition of our present conceptions. He says that in the history of the race, when man first became conscious of a world about him, his first explanation of all phenomena was theological, that is, he accounted for things by a Supernatural Will, or Wills, which acted upon the objective world. Later on, when the race became more developed, and when the order of nature began to be dimly perceived, the fiends or gods—who impelled the winds, directed the storm, and caused the river to flow—were replaced by entities, and this was the second of the three states, viz., the metaphysical. The theological phase of human thought reached its culmination in the conception of a one God, replacing all the inferior deities which had preceded him. The perfection of the metaphysical state, or its culmination, was when Nature replaced all the entities which were supposed to control the universe. The

last, or positive stage, is the scientific, in which men get rid of all conceptions of God, spirit, or entity, and see that the world is controlled by laws immutable and eternal. According to Comte, every child, in its progress toward manhood, goes naturally through these three stages, reflecting therein the life of the race. The belief in fairies and ghosts is as natural to the little boy or girl as it was and is to the savage. In the progress toward manhood, the notion of a first principle, or an entity, or force, or something indefinite, takes possession of the individual; but it requires the matured man to shake off these childish and ignorant fancies, that he may govern and control himself by the laws which we must observe if we would live.

Querist. You say that Positivism affords a solution of all the problems or ills affecting the human race. Do you affirm that if Positivism were generally and immediately adopted all human misery would cease?

Positivist. By no means. Positivism promises no Utopia,—is no dream. Man's life on this planet has been and is likely to be, for many generations to come, one of toil, of strife, of an eager battle with the material forces about him, to extract a subsistence. We do not say that the time will ever come when all the ills of life can be entirely done away with, but we do believe that with the conception of the real Supreme Being, with the profound belief in the ability of a true Human Providence to mitigate the fatalities of life on this planet, that the sum of human happiness will be very largely increased. But, to make this conception current, we find ourselves reluctantly compelled to attack the monstrously immoral doctrine of a personal life hereafter. Men must learn to accept realities. Recognizing the incontestable fact, pleasant or otherwise, that we are here, on this planet, we must consider next what are our duties here. If there is another life in addition to this, it is so far off, so difficult to under-

stand or describe, and our personal selfishness is so apt to be nourished by the idea of this strife for a life eternal, that we must put it away from us and attend to the work nearest at hand.

CONVERSATION THIRD.

Querist. As Positivism rejects personality in its conception of Deity, I judge you can not recognize the validity or use of prayer?

Positivist. There you are mistaken. Prayer, in the sense of petition, we reject. If the universe is controlled by invariable laws; if, indeed, life and society are subject them, it inevitably follows that prayer to set aside the order of nature would be futile and childish. As we reject the conception of a Supreme Will regulating our lives, we do not petition to have the order of nature changed in our behalf. Prayer, however, in its higher sense of commemoration and effusion, we accept as being not only useful, but necessary to complete our worship. The old form of prayer idealized God as a vain, arrogant human being, pleased with our abasement to him, and our exaltation of his virtues. It is curious how, in every cognition of Deity, it is always some purely human attribute we appeal to. In the more modern conception of God as the Heavenly Father we again meet with human qualities, but of a purer and higher character. It is the love, the mercy, the tender-heartedness of which we become conscious in our daily lives, that we transfer to this imaginary conception. Positivist prayer, then, like the prayer of the Christian, necessarily consists of, first, commemoration, the calling up to the mind's eye of some ideal of human excellence. This may be embodied in

some conception of humanity or of individual excellence; but in our family worship it would naturally lead to the idealizing of those dearest to us, mother, wife, or daughter. The Positivist in domestic worship does really perform an act of devotion to the supreme excellence in woman, in whatever shape it may be best presented to the understanding. With the image to be adored fixed in the mind, then follow the effusions and aspirations incident to a complete act of worship. Prayer, then, is one way of cultivating the higher emotions and aspirations. We recognize the physiological fact, that exercise is essential to the integrity not only of every organ of the body, but of every emotion of the human mind; and one of the afflictions of the state of anarchy and skepticism into which the civilized world is now plunged, is that our life affords but few opportunities for exercising our higher emotions—those of veneration, love, and effusion for the nobler exemplars of Humanity. Indeed, the development of respect and reverence for persons is almost obsolete in modern civilization. We Americans are a singularly irreverent people; human worth and excellence are neither regarded nor honored, and the popular comic poetry of the day is distinguished for its irreverent blasphemy. This gives low and mean views of life to our people, and I do not care in this connection to dwell upon the details of the Positivist's worship of human excellence, for the reason that it would inevitably excite the ridicule of the average American reader; all sense of what is noble in human life has been so educated out of him by the prevailing liberal theology and metaphysical thought which dominates the literature of the day, while the past, with its holy associations, has fallen into such disrepute that the means used by the complete Positivist to idealize and glorify human excellence would seem trivial and absurd. Probably the only classes in

the community who would see its value would be the women or the uneducated poor. Comte, in his provisional regulations, insisted that at least two hours per day should be spent in prayer, the time being divided between morning, midday, and evening acts of worship. These minute directions were given for the reason that Comte recognized man as a creature of habit; that the emotions which control us came to us from our ancestors, and that we should transmit them to our children. In prayer, according to him, the worshipers became for the time being poets; they were to compose the words themselves; it should be an act of individual worship. In this view prayer was but the cultivation of the feelings, the chastening of the emotions, and their devotion to some object outside of the individual. But while recognizing the necessity of this period of aspiration and effusion, Comte was careful to point out that, after all, right action was of vastly more importance than right feeling, that unless the fruit of this cultivation of the emotions could be seen in the daily life—in acts of benevolence—it was misleading and useless. In these provisional instructions given by Comte, he made use of the terms known in the older religions, such as Guardian Angels, Patron Saints, and the like. He insisted that our lives were properly dominated by some ideals of human excellence as revealed to us in human form, and that these intellectual or artistic conceptions were our real Guardian Angels. To most men and women the mother would be the one to whom the affections would naturally flow out most freely. If not the mother, then some other woman, whose life was dear to us. This idealization of particular excellences should really dominate our life and inform our affections. It needs but a glance at the motives which actuate men about us, to see that this conception, in a greater degree than we realize even now, influences the lives of men and

women. A sect with any vitality whatever must have its human exponent; to the Christian, it is the man Christ Jesus; to the Catholic, it is the Holy Virgin Mother. The barrenness, the want of spiritual and moral fruit, in the ordinary Deistic and Unitarian conception of the Godhead, is this lack of the human element. Churches founded upon a deity "silent forever, and asleep above the stars," must in time perish. Mohammed, after all, was the true God of the Islamite; his Allah was a dream. The vitality, as I have said, of the Christian Church, is the dying Saviour on the cross, the man Christ Jesus. Look around and see what influence it is that most affects young men of a collegiate education, and you will find, if it is outside of their own family in the person of their father, it is usually the president of the college in which they matriculated, or some favorite professor. It is Drs. Wayland, Sears, Woolsey, or Anderson. Men can only be touched by instances of human excellence; all dreams of divine perfection are but dreams. God must be made manifest in the flesh before our human senses can take hold of the divine; and it is upon this fact of our nature that Positivism builds its worship; it idealizes human excellences in all the relations of life, and they become to it real entities for the purpose of worship.

Querist. You do not then think there is any validity in the ordinary Deistic or Unitarian conception of God?

Positivist. Let me repeat in a somewhat different form what I have before stated. The conception of God is a summation, as it were, at once of man's knowledge and his ignorance. All that we can know in the conception of God is purely human, the projection of humanity out into space; the only reality in God is humanity. But the idealization also shows man's ignorance, for joined with this human conception are imaginings wholly outside of the range of man's powers. By the very constitution of

his nature, as most conservative and Christian philosophers have shown, man can not know the Infinite or Absolute, and it is wholly beyond his powers to cognize First or Final causes. It is a singular fact, as I have stated before, that while Auguste Comte has taken the human part of the conception of Deity, and idealized it as the real Supreme Being, Herbert Spencer and some of his followers in this country have appropriated the unknowable part of the notion of Deity, that portion of it which represents and emphasizes human limitation and ignorance, and have recognized it as the mystery we are to worship and adore. It seems to us the logical result of Spencer's position is an entire denial of any Deity or of any possibility of our conceiving a Deity, and in that sense, indeed, it is true that we can not know the unknowable; we can not transcend the limits of our human intelligence, which, as Sir William Hamilton expresses it, is "conditioned" in time and space; and what does not exist in time and space is wholly apart from our daily lives, and inconceivable.

Querist. I have understood you to say that there is some value and truth in all religions; how do you reconcile this with your belief in the illusory character of the theologies of past times?

Positivist. All previous theologies must have had some relation to human wants, or they would not have existed; they therefore must have had either some objective or some subjective truth, that is, they were either accordant with the order of nature, or satisfied some of the subjective needs of the race. Hence, in analyzing the theologies of the past, we really find that they were either an explanation of the visible universe, or some satisfaction to human aspirations and hopes. Hence Positivism accepts all the creeds of the past, and in our Pantheon all religious teachers are duly honored; this makes it the most catholic of all forms of faith, and in the revised calendar

instituted by Auguste Comte will be found, among the names of those who have served Humanity in the past, the leaders so far as known of every great religious movement—Moses, Brahma, Buddha, Confucius, Zoroaster, Mohammed, and St. Paul; all these are wisely regarded as among Humanity's noblest organs. Positivism aims to be the summation of all that was excellent and true in these previous conceptions.

Querist. You have spoken of the worship of woman,—would not this tend to flatter human vanity and personal pride?

Positivist. No; the whole *cultus* of our faith is to rid us of selfishness, of egotism. While the man worships the woman as the representative of the moral sense, she, in her turn and in her way, worships the man as the incarnated Human Providence. The noblest legacies, as we think, the past has given us were the age of chivalry and the worship of the Virgin Mother, for in both it was the human woman who was adored. This worship of woman was a spontaneous one; we wish to revive it and make it a part of our religious *cultus*. The intellectual statement of what we desire to do would but faintly shadow forth the high associations and aspirations which we wish to cluster about this ideal of womanhood, in the worship of mother, wife, and daughter.

Querist. You are aware of the objection raised by Mr. Mill against the Positive *cultus*, that though "there is nothing really ridiculous in the devotional practices which M. Comte recommends toward a cherished memory or an ennobling ideal, when they come unprompted from the depths of the individual feeling, there is something ineffably ludicrous in enjoining that everybody shall practice them three times daily for a period of two hours, not because his feelings desire them, but for the premeditated purpose of getting his feelings up." In this view, fully

nine-tenths of intelligent readers agree. What say you to it?

Positivist. To state it mildly, the objection reposes on a profound fallacy. Such a statement presupposes that the feelings should be subjected to no discipline, and that spontaneity is the only measure of the moral worth of devotion. Now, why should spontaneity be the measure here any more than in intellectual acquirements or in the domain of practice? The standard by which we judge of eminence in business or in science is surely not the fact that it comes unprompted from the depths of individual brain or muscle, but that it returns large results. Men study years, and "by time and toil and terrible denial" make a discovery which immortalizes them. Is there anything ineffably ludicrous in doing this? Would it not be infinitely more ludicrous to expect to make the discovery without this pursuit? To be sure, it might be easier if it came "unprompted;" but we have to deal with facts as we find them, not as we would have them, and Mr. Mill is one of those who always insist upon this distinction. In order to prove their case, these objectors would have to show that M. Comte's standard for judging of the worth of devotional exercises was wrong, or secondly, that his means were not adequate to his ends. Have they done either? I think not. It is always easy to assert that a practice in which one does not believe is ineffably ludicrous; it is a much more arduous task to show that the reasons for which it is recommended are foundationless. M. Comte judged devotional exercises by their results, as the world judges everything else, and having clearly formulated in his mind the end to be attained, he recommended a set of practices. No one pretends that they are complete or final. "All is relative," said this great master when nineteen years old; "this is the only absolute principle," and to it he always adhered.

Querist. You then believe that as the muscles and logical powers require training, so do the feelings of love, sympathy, and the like?

Positivist. I certainly do; and I further think it the only common-sense view. It may be well to say, moreover, that the very spontaneity which Mr. Mill insists upon will come into existence in that way much more quickly than by trusting to the unprompted depths of individual feeling, which, by the way, may affect the race as often for evil as for good, except this discipline of an ideal is kept clearly before it. Every student of history is aware that it was just this object that the great religious teachers of the past set before them. They knew human nature too well, they lived in too much turbulent selfishness to trust to the unaided promptings of the individual. Mr. Mill has overlooked a very important fact in his criticism. It is this, that so many—indeed, the immense majority of the race—are dominated by selfishness. The *cultus* proclaimed by M. Comte set to work consciously to subordinate this egoism, as he called it, to unselfishness or altruism. Now, it would indeed be wisdom to leave these practices to the promptings of the individual when those promptings would lead him—except on rare occasions and in exceptional cases—into entirely different courses. The individual promptings can be trusted, in rare cases, to become a philosopher or a scholar, but he would not be accounted a very wise man who would therefore abolish schools and colleges, and even burn all books. Whatever may be said as to the details to Comte's scheme, as it pervades his work, there can be no question that his general conception was correct, and that if our present attitude toward theology remains and grows more prominent, it will and must be accepted.

Querist. Positivism has been classed with materialism. How did this error originate?

Positivist. Very naturally. Science, at first, dealt with matter. The inorganic sciences were first developed. They dealt with the weight, measurement, and composition of material things. It is but recently that science has come to apply its methods to biology—that is, to life; and still more recent are its investigations in sociology—the relations of men—the science of society. The criticism, therefore, that Positivism is materialistic, while entirely untrue, is a very pardonable error of judgment, but is none the less an error on that account, and a most unfortunate one. The fact is, that religious Positivism is one of the most spiritual of all the forms of faith. It deals with human passions and emotions, with society, and not at all or incidentally with gross matter. Indeed, as I have already stated elsewhere, all this talk of "matter" and "spirit" consists of mere words. It is an expression of unthinkable conceptions in words of human consciousness, and really means nothing. The imputation conveyed in the charge of materialism against Positivism is erroneous, as a most cursory knowledge of our system will show. But we can not get rid of this imputation, due to the ignorance of our adversaries, for many years to come. Let it, however, be steadily borne in mind that we protest against it, and claim for Positivism that it is the culmination of all that is aspirational in humanity.

CONVERSATION FOURTH.

Querist. You speak of some organized authority superior to the practical authority exercised by the men of wealth. What is this spiritual power, and how is it to be organized?

Positivist. In our scheme the spiritual power is public opinion, whose proper organ is a priesthood composed mainly of the philosophers, scientists, and artists. It was the opinion of Auguste Comte that spontaneously throughout civilization this new spiritual authority would spring up, and that no one would dream of contesting the right of the scientist to guide men's lives and inform their opinions quite as fully as the priestly class have done in past ages. Nay, more, the Priests of the Past, with very few exceptions, did not generally obtain credence with all classes of the community, while the scientist will necessarily be accepted as authority on all matters within the range of his studies and powers. We already see throughout civilization that this unquestioned faith is felt in the scientific body. No one dreams of disbelieving the astronomer when he tells us that an eclipse will take place at such a time; we believe him to the very fractions of a minute, and the event justifies our faith. So up through all the inorganic sciences, when a statement is made that a definite result has been reached, no one thinks of contesting it, even in those matters in which we have the evidence of our senses to the contrary; we unhesitatingly accept the verdict of science when it says our eyes deceive us, as in the apparent rising of the sun in the east and its setting in the west.

Querist. It is your opinion, then, that science will take possession of the domains of morality and religion as

completely as it has heretofore done the whole range of the sciences relating to the inorganic world?

Positivist. Yes, that is our belief. Auguste Comte has pointed out the natural order in which the sciences have been studied, and has indicated the problems which now concern it: those of a biological character, that is, relating to life in general; next in the scale comes sociology, the science of society, and all the best efforts of the most advanced thinkers are being directed to the study of those questions which concern human life and society.

Querist. Don't I understand that Comte condemned the scientists for their specialism, for devoting their lives to pursuits that had no immediate influence upon human life?

Positivist. He did. When he began his career as a philosopher, he found the great body of scientific men unaware, as he thought, of their great function,—of the vast social use to which their studies should apply. He argued: that, after all, the supreme object of all thought, as well as action on this globe, should be to the elevation of humanity; and he condemned, perhaps too hastily, all investigations which did not tend mediately or immediately to improve the condition of men, or to bring them more into harmony with the environment by which they were surrounded. We who accept his teachings, think that perhaps he was too hasty in condemning so vigorously all studies which did not have human good for their immediate object. Indeed, he himself has pointed out how valuable were the apparently purposeless speculations of the Greeks in Geometry which were not utilized until 2,000 years had passed away; for, as he truly says, the mariners of to-day navigate the seas by the aid of the results of those same speculations which to a Comte of that day would have seemed purposeless. Although Comte inclined to a belief in the nebular hypothesis at

one period of his life, he subsequently condemned all investigations relating to the origin of the universe or the beginning of life as unavailable for any immediate human use. He seemed to think that these recondite speculations were intended only to satisfy an idle curiosity. We, however, dissent in a measure from this view, while with him we wish constantly to keep in mind that the final object of all science, as of all art, is to enrich and ennoble humanity as well as make its material environment more in harmony with its life. But the very essence of Positivism is to accept the inevitable. Scientific investigation has pursued a march of its own, which Comte himself clearly pointed out, and the investigations with which it now busies itself of a biological character are a necessary introduction to the sociological studies which are already perceived to be of vital importance. Hence we are not disposed to quarrel with Haeckel, Darwin, Wallace, or Herbert Spencer, as we deem their studies a necessary connection between the lower and the higher sciences.

Querist. You say, then, that your scientists are the priests of the future, the true exponents of the spiritual power which is to finally control men in all their actions?

Positivist. Yes, that is our view. As yet we regret to say the scientific body are practically unaware of their high mission. Devoted to their several special studies, they have failed to take advantage of the unhesitating acceptance of their views by the world at large. Hence we see the curious spectacle of the real exponents of the spiritual power, the scientists, contented to occupy a subordinate position, and to leave the guidance of men's reason and conscience on all the higher themes relating to the race, to the exponents of the old theology and to the newspapers. During all ages this spiritual power, which we now know vaguely by the name of public opinion, has

been influencing the higher emotions as well as the daily lives of men. The Roman motto that the "voice of the people was the voice of God," foreshadowed this conception. We adopt that as a Positivist maxim, but we insist that this voice shall have an organ, and that that organ of humanity shall be the scientific body. For the present, the age partially accepts the control of the clergymen, the priests, in the old sense; but the difficulty is, that as science is constantly destroying all the intellectual conceptions upon which the prevailing theologies rest, the old priestly body is losing its influence. The growth of infidelity, so-called — of skepticism, and that mongrel product of modern thought known as liberalism—is making the rule of the ministers, the clergymen, simply contemptible; they are losing all their social force. The newspaper has, in a great measure, usurped the place naturally occupied by the priest; it is a real pontiff in matters of secular concern,—in questions affecting our daily life; but at the best, the newspaper is an illegitimate pontiff; it is so necessarily allied to material interests, so controlled by capital, by party, by the personal aims of its owners, that it speaks with an uncertain voice. It is compelled to follow rather than lead, to conform to rather than inform the public mind.

Querist. Do you see any indications of the scientific body realizing their as yet unused power?

Positivist. Yes; we think that unconsciously, without effort of their own, they are coming to the front to lead public opinion. The organization of the so-called social-science congress is a first step toward taking the direction of society. Science now busies itself with the public hygiene, with drainage, and with a vast number of questions directly affecting our daily life. A step farther will compel trained scientific specialists to study the phenomena of society with a view to getting at the laws

which control us, so that we may obey after we discover them. Nor can science stop short of our material wants; it must solve all those problems which affect our higher nature, especially our affections; it must also learn to preach the religion of Humanity.

Querist. You spoke just now of the artist as being a part of the priestly body of the future,—what do you mean?

Positivist. While the man of science gives the programme, as it were, of our life, it is the business of the artist to embody it in form; hence the poet, the painter, the sculptor will clothe our fair humanity with forms of beauty, and will minister to our esthetic and affectional nature. Positivists place the heart above the intellect, the affections above the judgment; they see very clearly that of the motives which influence mankind, those which spring from the emotions, especially the higher emotions, are, though not the most powerful at any one time, still so persistent that they become so in the lapse of ages, and that intellect is, after all, but the rudder to the ship, that can only direct the way in which we should go; the impelling force lies in a very different quarter.

Querist. In what respect will the constitution of your spiritual body differ from the old order?

Positivist. That which has corrupted the church in times past has been the possession of wealth and power. It is impossible for a true spiritual authority to exist which wields any material force whatever. The philosopher, the scientist, the artist with us, while his maintenance should be guaranteed by society, must consent to renounce all hope of wielding power and all expectation of holding great wealth. The history of the past is full of warnings on this subject, of the unfitness of the thinker to be the practical man, of the inability of the artist class to save money or to spend it wisely. The effort of the philoso-

phers, and even of the literary class, to wield power has always proved mischievous.

Querist. Did not Comte give a number of very arbitrary regulations with regard to the pay of the priests, which have brought a great deal of ridicule upon his system?

Positivist. That is true; and yet the ridicule is misplaced. Comte was a Frenchman, writing for Frenchmen; he knew this too well to state abstract propositions without giving concrete examples; he therefore was careful in setting forth what he deemed the normal state of society to accompany it by a plan by which he thought it could be realized. Neither he nor any of his disciples have ever claimed any peculiar sacredness for the plans which he put forth. He admitted, and they believed, that in the progress of society they would be altered and made to fit existing exigencies. But as men's minds are ordinarily constituted, it is wise to give them provisional schemes by which to guide their thoughts and lives. Hence, when Comte said the High Priest should receive so many francs per year, and should live in a certain place, and when in addition he specified the functions of all the inferior order of clergy, even to such details as the salaries, he was but satisfying a legitimate curiosity as to what was his ideal of society. His later works are full of what seem to be arbitrary schemes for the control of men and women in society. They are not final, they are only provisional in their character, and they must not be confounded with the larger intellectual conceptions upon which they were based. There is not a person who would not consent to the statement that in times past the priesthood has been corrupted by the exercise of power and the possession of wealth. Auguste Comte has pointed out with great force the difference which exists between men of thought and men of action; he has shown that the practical power should be in the hands of the practical men, while the

spiritual power should be lodged with those who have devoted their lives to thought, science, and art. We are already familiar with the great advantage to civilization of the specialization of industries. The man who devotes himself to few things is much more likely to achieve perfection and to be of value to his race than he who attempts to do too many things. Modern industry in every department is made more fruitful and profitable by the devotion of certain persons to special pursuits. Applying this idea to larger conceptions he was quite justified in dividing society into the three great classes of the thinkers or priests, of the practical men who had actual control of the business affairs, and of the workmen whose business it was to pursue their several avocations; but all classes were never to forget that they were living and working for Humanity. The Positivist Priest, then, is to be supported by the wealth of the community, so that he can pursue his studies, without interruption, for the benefit of the race. This idea is not unknown to our civilization now, for in college professorships and fellowships, the reason for their founding is the leisure they afford certain men to devote their lives to special studies. It is tacitly understood that men who pursue those studies give up thereby any hope of great wealth or of practical power in the community. We do not think of making college professors presidents or senators, and no sane man holds that the wealth of the community should be poured upon them; but there is a very general feeling that they should have all the necessaries and some of the luxuries of life. The artist class also, it is generally felt, should be somewhat better treated than the mere thinker or professor, but as a rule the poet, the painter, and sculptor are not fitted for practical authority or for the possession of wealth. They are generally a thriftless class; their esthetic natures demand luxury; but the ability to keep

money is unusual, and is very properly regarded as unnatural in the artist. They, too, in the Positivist's programme, are to be taken care of, to have all the necessaries, and a great deal more of the luxuries of life than the philosopher or scientist, but they are not to be troubled by material power or the care of excessive wealth. The very character of their pursuits forbids any such duties being assigned to them. Who thinks of making Longfellow or Bryant or Whittier president or senator? and how absurd it would be for men such as these to be cumbered with the cares incident to the possession of vast wealth! It is our hope that the time is not far distant when scientific men will feel, as a body, their high social mission. It is time, for instance, that in this country, at the annual gathering of our scientists, they should demand of wealthy men the means by which their important studies should be pursued. It is to the extreme discredit both of our government and of our wealthy men that so far either has done little or nothing for science. I hope to see the time when millions of dollars will be devoted every year to the forwarding of scientific investigation in every department in this country. The difficulty in the way is the indifference, or rather want of comprehension of the scientists themselves. Students in science have felt the necessity of additional means to pursue their studies, but each one feels that to make an appeal for his special pursuit would do very little good. The paleontologist knows very well what kind of a reception he would meet were he to make an appeal to any rich man for the means to collect the necessary museums and pursue the proper investigations by which his department of science could be represented in this country. Rich men, in a general way, know that science is of immense use to them practically, and a proper appeal made concurrently by the whole scientific body would, I have no doubt, find a generous

response. As it is, the amount of money set aside for scientific investigation in this country is absurdly small in amount, and in comparison with what has been done on the continent of Europe is discreditable to us as a nation. But as I have said, until the scientific body itself is aware of its high mission and social importance we can not expect that this matter will receive proper attention.

CONVERSATION FIFTH.

Querist. The more or less hostile attitude of many thinkers not otherwise prepossessed against Comte's construction appears to be due to his use, and their rejection, of the "Subjective Method." What is your opinion of its legitimacy and of their objections?

Positivist. The question of method is one of supreme importance, and so Positivists of all kinds regard it. The difference between the two schools into which those accepting the designation of Comte's disciples are now divided, lies in the fact that one holds that the Positive Method is merely objective and can consequently never do more than give us a more or less complete intellectual system, while the other contends that that method has two branches—an objective and subjective—the former summing up the intellectual progress of the race and pointing out the road to further advances, while the latter groups the life, thought, and action of man about this conception of the race, deducing his duties in the present and for the future from it. It is agreed that man and the world form the two-fold object of speculation. The laws of the physical world govern the human race in their entirety, while man can only modify by knowing them. Hence

the Positive Method lays it down as a fundamental axiom that legitimate speculation must begin with the physical world. It also holds that in his chemical and anatomical elements man can not form a class apart. It therefore takes the side of the monistic school as now represented by Huxley, Darwin, Spencer, and Haeckel, as against the dualistic school of naturalists represented by Owen, Agassiz, and others. No one has ever asserted this truth more fully than Comte. He held, indeed, that the very spirit of modern research was shown by the fact, that in ancient times inorganic nature was measured in terms of man, while in modern the tendency is more and more to reverse the process and measure man in terms of inorganic nature. So far all Positivists are agreed. This is what is called the Objective Method. It begins at a point farthest away from man and reasons up to him, including him in its domain. But now the schism begins. When Comte had completed his great intellectual construction, he immediately turned his attention to the social reorganization which he had always preached as being the ultimate goal of his labors. It was while thinking out this part of his programme that the full power of the great conception of the race as a continuous whole dawned upon him, and it was in working it out that he developed into its full proportions the Subjective Method.

Querist. But is not this conception of the race itself—Humanity as you call it—illegitimate if the Subjective Method be so declared?

Positivist. Not at all. And here let me clear up a confusion into which some have fallen. Many critics of Comte's "Polity" are certainly under the delusion that Humanity, the demonstrated Supreme Being acknowledged by us, is a creation of the Subjective Method, and that if the latter falls, the former falls also. This position is entirely false. Humanity was the grand result of the

"Philosophie Positive." Comte declares in his general conclusions in the sixth volume of that work, that "there is nothing great but humanity;" and in another place that "the moral properties inherent in the great conception of God can not be properly replaced by those belonging to the vague entity, Nature, but that they are, on the other hand, necessarily inferior both in intensity and stability to those characterizing the unchangeable notion of Humanity, which will at last rule over the combined satisfaction of all our essential wants—intellectual or social—in the full maturity of our collective organism." Humanity is thus seen to be achieved by the objective method, and every acceptor of the "Philosophie Positive" must accept this great conception.

Querist. Do I then understand you to mean that the subjective method is the mere recasting and classifying of the results of objective research in relation to this conception of Humanity?

Positivist. That is about what it amounts to, and by that very fact almost proves its legitimacy, scientifically considered. For it shows that it is not a short cut by which observation and experiment are dispensed with as some have asserted, or at least hinted. The subjective method does not construct fictitious materials out of the depths of human consciousness, it merely works up the materials furnished to it by real research. In a word, in the "Philosophie Positive" the mundane point of view is uppermost, but not supreme; in the "Politique Positive" the human point of view is uppermost, but not supreme. Comte had always held that philosophical maturity must bring about a real reconciliation of these two methods which were antagonistic in the past, and his own discoveries in Sociology, especially that sublime one of Humanity, pointed out the way to do it. If readers of Comte's later works would bear these few facts in mind,

there would be less misapprehension in regard to their bearings and their filiation to the "Philosophie Positive" than there now is.

Querist. But how do you account for the misapprehension? Certainly many of Comte's critics are well prepared to do him justice and deal with his system intelligently.

Positivist. Certainly they are, much better than the present speaker. But there are sources of error and confusion from which even great minds do not always steer clear. The term Subjective itself is one of those about which a misleading atmosphere lingers. I have explained the meaning in which it is used by Comte, and accepted by us. But at first sight many are apt to imagine that he used the term in a signification analogous to that of Kant, who employed it to mean mental moods or states of consciousness in opposition to the objectivity of the physical world. There can be no question that such use is made of the word in a few passages of Comte's writings, but when he uses it to qualify "method" it has the definition, and that only, pointed out a few moments ago. Akin to this source of error and confusion is one that may be traced to it. We are in the habit of speaking of Theological and Metaphysical philosophies as subjective, and when it is asserted that the subjective method predominates over Comte's political and religious construction we are apt to class them in the same category. This is, of course, a complete mistake. The subjective methods of the past were merely mental modes of investigating phenomena, and consequently returning fictitious results. The Subjective Method of Positivism does not investigate the world at all; it takes the great conception of the race, and around it groups present known truths, and points out what other truths it is most desirable to know. This is the merely intellectual part of the process. Then taking the results of the biological and sociological researches

into the past and present histories of nations and families of mankind, it points out by reference to this same great Being the best modes of satisfying its wants in the way of social institutions. This is the political part of it. The moral and religious part is summed up in pointing out a culture for the feelings esthetic, ethical, and reverential, which, while it will be in harmony with the past of the race, will tend to a better future. Granting that this is utopian, there is nothing in it logically illegitimate. The very essence of Positivism is the necessary relativity of institutions as well as of opinions. And hence no attempt will be made to force them upon any one or any people; and hence also any part of the scheme may, can, and must be changed if found unsuitable to the future of Humanity. Another source of error may be found in the fact that Comte's construction is so unlike the ideal which many thinkers have set before their mind and would desire to see attained. And hence aversion from the system leads to search for flaws in the method by which it has been achieved. In this direction, it is hardly necessary to add, lurk the greatest dangers for philosophers, as we all are so apt to think that truth and error somehow lie in the respective planes of our likes and dislikes. This is, of course, not a question of what we would like, but what is possible, taking the social beings called men as we find them. Whether or not the future will realize Comte's Utopia is what it is impossible yet to decide, but he must indeed be a blind man who does not detect many tendencies in that direction.

CONVERSATION SIXTH.

Querist. What do I understand by Positivist morality? Have you any starting-point, any conception of good and evil—right and wrong?

Positivist. Yes; we have the only basis, as we think, founded in a true conception of our human nature. Morality, to state it shortly, with us, is living for others; immorality is living for yourself. Comte's works are full of this conception; it was not new to him, of course; indeed, Adam Smith, from whom the self-interest school draws so many of its inspirations, very well understood this distinction, and in his two great works he discriminated the moral from the immoral conceptions. He showed in his "Wealth of Nations" how the selfish instinct, the self-interest working in man, did really achieve in many respects important ends for humanity, but in his "Moral Sentiments" he pointed out that sympathy was the basis of true morality. Mr. Darwin has re-stated this conception of morality in his "Descent of Man" with great force. Curiously enough, Mr. Wallace, among others, believes that this theory is original with him. Our purely egotistic instincts, our self-regarding passions, while necessarily of importance, are, if made the rule of our whole life, profoundly immoral. Anger, appetite, lust, all the powers which we exercise for ourselves, are very powerful, but transient,—short lived; but sympathy, our regard for others, our affections for wife or child or friend, our public spirit, love of our nation, of our race, all these, while not so transiently powerful, are more permanent in our lives. Now it is a Positivist motto, that happiness should not be our aim in life, but as Carlyle has it, blessedness should; in other words, that form of self-gratifica-

tion which consists in an easy, pleasant, and selfish life, should not be our aim. Our happiness should consist in doing good to others, hence the motto of Positivism — "Live for Others." Now, unconsciously, the most selfish man is compelled to do this all his life. If we could sum up at the close of the day the result of all our thoughts and activities, we would find that nine-tenths of them had some one else than ourselves for their object. We partake of a dinner, but the chairs we sit upon, the table we use, the food we eat, represent the labors of hundreds of persons whom we have never seen, and for whom we unconsciously work without thinking of the social character of our labors. Now we wish to make this unconscious living for others conscious; we desire to make it the rule of our lives and cultivate our sympathetic emotions, so as to purge ourselves of all selfishness, of all regard for our own personal happiness, and so make life one perpetual act of devotion to our fellow-men. This, with us, is no mere sentiment generated by an illusory enthusiasm, but this moral rule is a scientific verity, a fact, which we must regard in our daily lives. We are aware that this ideal is much higher than we can hope to attain in this life, but then our ideal always should be above the possibility of attainment; we must have some object higher than ourselves and beyond ourselves for which to work, and this scientific conception of morality, for it is as truly scientific as the law of gravitation, should enter into all our lives, inform all our thoughts, dictate all our activities. Let it be remembered, then, that in the Positivist's conception selfishness is infernal, is wickedness; and that sympathy or unselfishness is the crowning glory of our moral nature. Our motto of living for others is not an extravagant one, but one which is directly derived from a scientific human morality, the highest morality man can ever know. Indeed, all religion has sanctified this con-

ception of sacrifice — of the abnegation of self to some higher power and duty. That is why we have always maintained that any religion held by men which had in it this conception is better than no religion; this is why, while we profoundly dissent from the intellectual conceptions of Christianity, on the whole, we prefer the most orthodox Christian creed to the rationalism, skepticism, and atheism of the modern mind. Man is made to believe, and we look with abhorrence upon those schools of thought which reject those noble religious conceptions of self-abnegation, of sacrifice, of living for an ideal outside of one's own mean life.

Querist. What is your attitude toward the prevailing economical philosophy of the day?

Positivist. For our part, we entirely discredit the teachings of Ben Franklin and his school. We look upon the Poor Richard maxims as having had a deplorable effect upon the American character; the meanness they inculcate, the saving, the living for one's self has given a tone to the Yankee mind which is anything but desirable. With us, it is only the capitalists who should save. We have no faith in savings banks, or any institution which cultivates the accumulating faculty in the working class. We discourage the desire in them to save, to secure better positions in life, or to get out of their class; all this, we teach, is immoral. The results of past labor should be taken care of; we should transmit all the wealth we receive, with something in addition, to future generations; but this is to be done by the capitalist, not by the laborer. His business is to give honest service to the employer, and through him to Humanity; but we do not ask of him to save beyond the necessary thrift which his means and circumstances demand. In the future, the workingman will be in as desirable a position as the rich man, whose responsibility will be so great that many of the latter will

voluntarily abdicate their positions and enter the working or priestly class.

Querist. I have heard you frequently use the word Duties instead of Rights,—what do you mean?

Positivist. We insist that this clamor for human rights is a mistake, for the only right a man has is the right to do his duty. The demand for rights comes down to us from the teachings of the metaphysical schools of thought which still afflict civilization. The demand for rights involves a disturbance all through society. If the question were one of duties, it would be easy to simplify the whole matter. Doing one's duty involves no quarrel, and hence the whole modern movement for reform commences at the wrong end. It is inevitable, of course, that we should pass through that stage. It is probable that the extension of the so-called rights in our modern constitutions will have a beneficial influence in the education of mankind for a better future; but it seems to us that far more good would be done if every class who think they are abused would devote themselves to the study of what are their duties rather than what are their rights. It is for this reason that we can not be active partisans of the movement to give women the ballot. We can see that all this has an educational influence which is for good, that through it women are learning their social function, and the necessity which exists for their acting upon public opinion; but we believe that in the end the only value of this extension of so-called rights to women will be to show the inutility of the whole movement.

CONVERSATION SEVENTH.

Querist. You have spoken in several places of Comte's discoveries,—what do you mean?

Positivist. This is certainly a difficult subject to deal with. On the one side these discoveries are scattered up and down in twelve large volumes, which makes it hard to collate them into convenient popular shape; and on the other hand, when so collected and their due praise allowed to them, many readers will be inclined to think that it is a fulsome eulogy upon Comte. But, however, I will select a few points upon which to direct attention, and while dealing with them it will be seen how much Comte has anticipated upon recent scientific inquiries. Comte was the first to discover the law of the historic progress of mankind. Others before him had asserted that man was a progressive being, but when brought to task for this assertion it was found to be a mere assertion, and nothing more. He, for the first time, asserted a *vera causa* for human progress, namely, the positive investigation of nature; and thus he became as truly a discoverer as Newton, but in a different sphere. On examining the works of Sir J. Lubbock "On the Origin of Civilization," or of Mr. E. B. Tylor "On the Early History of Mankind," and "Primitive Culture," it is easily perceived how identical are their general conclusions with those advanced by Comte in 1822, in an essay upon "A Sketch of the Labors Necessary to Re-organize Society," and more fully elaborated in the fifth volume of the "Cours de Philosophie Positive," and the third volume of the "Système de Politique Positive." No better account has ever been given of man's primitive condition, intellectually and morally considered, than can be found in the places indicated.

Querist. But has not Comte's law of intellectual progress been proved to be erroneous, at least in part?

Positivist. I think not. On the contrary, every recent inquirer is making more evident the fact, that the early mental condition of the race was what Comte asserted it to be, and showed that it was, namely, a childish state, in which the unlimited power of *will*, whether natural or supernatural, was believed in. Even Mr. Darwin comes to the support of this doctrine in his "Descent of Man;" and it is well known that Tylor and Lubbock, confining ourselves to England, hold the same view. Perhaps one cause of the denial of Comte's law may lie in the fact that a certain stage of Positivity is found juxtaposed with Theologism in the early ages. It must be noted, however, that with advance in speculation "Theologism" apparently widens her borders and takes in much of this so-called Positivity, for it was the Positivity of indifference, not of knowledge. But even in this stage there were some few things learned which formed the germ out of which the real Positive Evolution in which we now take part arose.

Querist. Then you hold that Comte was the Newton of Sociology?

Positivist. We do; and in saying so we mean that he thus became the founder of the new social *régime* which is its direct outcome. In investigating the history of the race he was led to discover the filiation of the great peoples of the past to each other, and to assign their true places to certain transition periods which before were inordinately decried. Every day is making more apparent that his defense of the Middle Ages was well timed, and that his conception of their place in the education of the race is perfectly exact. In his analysis of those times he pointed out the greatness of the Catholic Church as being the *chef d'œuvre* of the constructions of the human race;

and in his recent work upon "The Witness of History to Christ," Rev. F. W. Farrar quotes the expression in terms of praise. But it is useless to go on in this strain. His whole analysis of history is one grand discovery. As Mr. Mill truly remarks, "The extraordinary merits of this historical analysis can only be appreciated after reading the work in which alone it can be found."

Querist. But though Comte was, as you assert, a believer in the progress of the human race, was he not a believer in the fixity of species?

Positivist. It is certain that Comte did not hold the present transformation views with regard to the "Origin of Species." Comte himself did not have time to make "life" a specialty, and therefore, taking the views put forth by the most approved masters of that science, he accepted what he thought most consonant with scientific truth in all its branches, and rejected the opposite. That he was not bigoted is well shown by his eulogy of Lamarck, who was certainly the greatest scientific zoologist preceding Charles Darwin who accepted the transformation hypothesis. I do not think there is much in Comte's criticism upon Lamarck's views which would not be accepted as perfectly just and proper by either Darwin or Huxley. Perhaps if Comte had lived now he would be a follower of Darwin; certain it is that he would accept and eulogize many of this great thinker's results, which throw such light upon the dim beginnings of our race. It is assuredly no reproach to our great philosopher that he did not discover a *vera causa* for transformation as Darwin and he only has done, and, on the contrary, it is a great merit that he was not seduced by his love for progress into accepting an ill-founded but brilliant hypothesis.

Querist. Comte was, if I mistake not, an upholder in youth of the "Nebular Hypothesis" of Kant, Laplace, and Sir W. Herschel,—why did he abandon it?

Positivist. His belief in this hypothesis is another instance of Comte's acceptance of the Evolution theory in its entirety. In youth he appears to have held that if the nebular hypothesis could be demonstrated it would greatly simplify the study of astronomy and throw light upon the origin of the earth. As he grew older he began to see the impossibility of this demonstration, and to feel the new difficulties which facts before unobserved threw in its way. This was his reason for not exactly abandoning it, but for putting it on one side until after the settlement of more vital questions. It is now safe to say that if ever any such hypothesis is verified, it will differ very materially from the hypothesis sketched independently by the great metaphysician Kant, the great astronomer Herschel, and the great mathematician Laplace, of the eighteenth century.

Querist. Now that we have got through with this point of Evolution, what further discoveries and anticipations of Comte's are there?

Positivist. The second point to which I will direct your attention is Mental Science, or, as some call it, Psychology.

Querist. Why, Comte did not believe in Psychology?

Positivist. Well, he did not believe in the word, but he did in the thing. And whether as to method or doctrine, the whole subject which we now usually call Psychology owes a large debt to him. Comte was the first intelligent critic and eulogist of Gall and his system. He saw clearly the elements of error in Phrenology, Craniology, Bumpology; but while perceiving distinctly how precarious were many of these empirical conclusions, he never denied but that they possessed some truth. We are about to witness the prevalence of these common-sense views if some signs of the times in medical circles are not illusory. Comte criticised harshly, but few that know his time will be found to say unjustly, the metaphysical methods then and now in

vogue for interrogating the mind. The whole study of mind consisted, according to them, in an internal examination—interrogation of the individual mind by the individual mind. Comte held this to be an illusory process, thus agreeing with his great cotemporary Cuvier. Perhaps he went too far, but his own organon was a very powerful one. He studied the organ and function, the brain and mental action, the one being supplementary of the other, and utilized mental diseases to throw light upon the processes in health. He says in one place that his own experience, when under an acute attack of mental alienation, was of use to him in his review of Broussais's celebrated book, "Sur l'Irritation et la Folie." A second process was by following the history of the race to reach exact conclusions upon the practical processes used by Humanity in obtaining its well-founded conclusions. Not a work on either the Physiology of the Brain or on Insanity has appeared for years that has not appropriated these ideas. One of the most recent, and one of the very best, on the latter, Mr. Blandford's lectures on "Insanity and its Treatment," delivered before the students of the School of St. George's Hospital, London, and just reprinted in this country, especially claims this as the only way to reach any sound conclusions upon that intricate subject. So does Dr. Maudsley, in his able "Physiology and Pathology of the Mind." And it is hardly necessary to say that though the subject of insanity is not calling forth the same attention in either France or Germany as in England, still the same method is applied to the study of the healthy mind in both those countries. Metaphysical psychology, whether intuitionist or sensationalist, is dead in France, and on its last academic legs in Germany, where Helmholtz, Vogt, Meyer, and others, have applied the positive method with the most splendid results to the study of mind and the senses. These thinkers may owe nothing

directly to Comte, but candid men will be likely to acknowledge that he preceded them, and that at least some of his thoughts may have gotten into the air, which they unconsciously breathed.

Querist. Did not your founder also speculate upon a certain unity which he called health, and a breach of this unity which he called disease, and has not this idea been criticised and rejected?

Positivist. In his old age Comte speculated largely on health and disease. In the course of these speculations he threw out an hypothesis that disease, properly so-called, was, in all cases, a rupture of the unity of the whole organic system, as represented in the brain. This unity was health, and the causes to which its rupture and consequent malady were due were of two kinds—internal and external. This doctrine, the details of which can not be now given, was communicated in a series of letters on medicine to a French physician, Dr. Audiffrent, and published in Robinet's "Life and Work." The theory is already being discussed in France particularly, and very many physicians, especially Drs. Audiffrent and Bridges, think it an hypothesis likely to prove fertile. Mr. Mill, in his review of Comte, on the other hand, attacked it in the most lively manner. He characterized it as an instance of the wild speculations into which that philosopher in his second career had fallen. Of course Mr. Mill is entitled to hold his own opinion on this subject and express with any amount of abhorrence his disgust with any conflicting opinion, but after all, one may be inclined to rather trust the views of those who have studied a subject, even if their opponents think them a little wild at times, than those who have not. Mr. Mill has not studied medicine or mind physiologically, but Dr. Maudsley has, and it is very curious to find him, in the third of his recent Gulstonian lectures upon "Body and Mind," very quietly and cautiously indorsing Comte's

doctrine, not as from Comte, be it understood, but as *ex cathedrâ*. Comment is unnecessary. This idea must not be so very absurd when such a master in Israel holds it and publishes it.

Querist. Comte's views upon the past of the race being such as you have stated them, how did he account for human morality, and what was his moral standard?

Positivist. Positivists are all agreed in thinking that one of Comte's greatest discoveries was the true theory of Morality. He held that it was founded upon our social instincts, and that it was improved and extended by the continual practice to which intercourse with our fellows, either as (1) parents and children; (2) as husbands and wives; or (3) as members of a great community in which each was working for the other and for the good of the whole. In opposition to the Church, he held that men had organically "benevolent" impulses entirely outside of any real or supposed impartation of divine grace; while in opposition to metaphysical moralists, whether of the Intuition or Experiential school, that this benevolence was a social instinct *sui generis*, completely distinct from any personal innate knowledge of right and wrong, or any calculations of self-interest. This point was fundamental with Comte. Mill says of him, parodying Novalis's characterization of Spinoza, that he was a "morality-intoxicated man." If he was intoxicated with it, the morality is certainly of the highest order the race has yet seen, and hence his infatuation may perhaps be pardoned.

Querist. Where in Comte's works can a good statement of this point be found?

Positivist. The point is so entirely fundamental that no reader of Comte's works can mistake it. But it is brought out in his discussions of Sociology in the "Philosophie Positive," in his short statement of ethics in the "Politique Positive," besides being distinctly laid down

in his sketch of a projected system of morality which he did not live to execute, published in Robinet's "Life and Work." There are scattered references to it in all his works, but the general inquirer need go no farther than the chapter upon the "Social Aspects of Positivism," in "A General View of Positivism," translated by Dr. J. H. Bridges, to find it summarily stated. Now, the curious part of it is, that in the third chapter of his "Descent of Man," Mr. Darwin, after passing in review the recent ethical theories of Spencer, Lubbock, and others, reaches an identical conclusion with that obtained by Comte at least thirty years ago. No student of Comte and Darwin can fail to be struck with the similarity, even down to some of the details. Whether Darwin rediscovered this great truth, or whether he considered it common property, makes little difference. He was certainly preceded by Comte, and few of us would have thought anything more of it but for Mr. Russel Wallace's *Academy* article. After giving an intelligent account of this theory, and justly praising it, he imputes it to Darwin as an original discovery. How true this is you can judge from what I have said; and, indeed, no careful reader of the first part of Mill's "Auguste Comte and Positivism" can fail to see that I have not misstated the Comtean position. It is surely a lamentable proof of the waste of intellectual energy, to which our present proud habits of so-called "independent thought" subjects us, when such men as Darwin and Wallace seem to be unacquainted with scientific results obtained perhaps forty years ago and published in a well-known work in 1838–'42. I hope I have said enough upon these points to show that "The Scientific Aspects of Positivism" are not exactly what a certain celebrated biologist has asserted them to be, and that if "it was enough to make David Hume turn in his grave to hear his most characteristic doctrines"—many of which,

by the way, he never held—"attributed to a dreary and verbose French writer of fifty years later date," it is enough now to make that so-called "dreary and verbose French writer" turn in his grave to find his most characteristic doctrines coolly appropriated by excellently clear and vivacious writers, and indorsed as original with them by other savans, while the whole scientific and literary world accept these indorsements without a murmur of dissent.

CONVERSATION EIGHTH.

Querist. In order to test the value of your sociological explanations of the polity of Positivism, what scheme have you for curing and settling the labor question?

Positivist. Let me here remark that we have no scheme in any arbitrary sense. We insist that society is ruled by laws as invariable as those which control the heavenly bodies,—that it is our business to seek and discover those laws, and then to conform to them. Hence Positivists look with suspicion on the whole tribe of reformers. There is no panacea for poverty and misery; there is no cure-all by which to get rid of the disturbances which agitate the modern world. We look upon the progress of society and try to discover its tendencies, and we then see what can be done to mitigate its inevitable fatalities. Let us take this question, for instance, of the relations of capital and labor. It is our belief that the world has entered, practically, upon an industrial period,—that great offensive and defensive wars will become rarer every decade,—that while it was natural that generals and military chieftains should have been the rulers in a war-like period, it is inevitable that chiefs in an industrial

period shall belong to the capitalist class—these are the real captains of industry. In noting the progress of modern society, one remarkable tendency has not escaped us. It is the great concentration of wealth into few hands, this tendency to concentration keeping pace with its aggregation. Side by side with this centralization of wealth in individual hands has grown up a state of extreme poverty among the mass of the community. England, for example, is at once the richest and the poorest country on earth, for it has the greatest wealth in a few hands, and it has the largest mass of miserably poor people. It is our belief that nothing can stop this tendency of wealth to concentrate in individual hands. The sentence of the Bible, that "unto every one which hath, shall be given; and from him which hath not, even that he hath shall be taken away from him," is clearly the characteristic of modern wealth. In our own country we see that this drift of things is very marked. For the first fifty or sixty years of its existence America was notably the country of a great middle class. Within the last forty years there has been developing a great capitalist class, and a diminution, relatively, of the middle class. In our own city of New York, twenty years ago saw a great multitude of little dry-goods stores scattered up and down Broadway, and in the side streets. To-day, the dry-goods business is practically concentrated into six or seven large establishments. Stewart's immense building represents three or four hundred smaller establishments. So also it is in manufacturing industry. During the middle-class era, when great public enterprises had to be undertaken, joint stock companies came into being, to build railroads, erect factories, construct bridges, dig canals, and perform those other great enterprises upon which so much of our modern civilization depends. They served their purpose well for a time, but we now see that these great corporations are

gradually but surely being eaten up by the large shareholders and capitalists. The joint stock era has culminated in the rankest corruption. Necessarily, as human nature is constituted, few men are honest enough to use, without abusing, the millions intrusted to them by other people. This has been the difficulty in nearly all joint stock companies, and the result is an amount of commercial immorality, throughout the civilized world connected with corporate enterprises, that is simply appalling to contemplate. The only cure for this wide-spread evil is individual responsibility. The corporation, as has been well said, has neither "a body to be kicked, nor a soul to be damned." Twelve men, who in their personal relations are honest and upright, associated together in a Board, are a convocation of scoundrels. They rob with impunity, because relieved of all personal responsibility. Positivism utterly rejects this whole machinery of modern civilization,—joint stock enterprises. It denounces banks, insurance companies, railway directories, in fact, all the machinery by which the commerce of the world is now carried on, and insists, in its place, on individual ownership and responsibility. The meanest swindle of all it considers to be the life insurance business. We have no hesitation in predicting that nine out of every ten life insurance companies will inevitably swindle the persons who deal with them. The purpose of the whole business is to take advantage of the laudable desire of people to provide for their families, to take from them their hard-earned money.

Querist. What is your remedy, then, for the evils connected with joint stock corporations?

Positivist. The system is rapidly correcting itself. The small stockholders are being robbed of their property by the large operators, and to-day we have, throughout civilization, the great railroad and banking kings. In our own country we have the Vanderbilts, Drews, Tom Scotts, Jay

Cookes, and others, who represent in themselves the property but a few years since held by tens of thousands of persons.

Querist. Does Positivism, then, propose to take away from these men the wealth so iniquitously acquired? Does it accept any of the communistic, socialistic, or agrarian theories now so rife?

Positivist. No; Positivism regards the concentration of wealth in few hands as not only an inevitable but a wholesome tendency. It deems that wealth is yet far too widely dispersed. It regards with disfavor all revolutionary schemes. It does not believe that wealth should be taken from the rich man, but on the contrary, that more wealth should be given to them. While it rejects as inadequate the socialistic solution of the problem, it accepts the fact that there is a problem to be solved in this matter,—but the solution is moral, and not political. In other words, the Positivist says we must accept the inevitable. Wealth, in an industrial age, necessarily gravitates into a few hands, but we say, as the Communist says, that wealth is social, not individual. In other words, we apply the laws of morality, which modern science has discovered, to wealth. We say that no man can be worth a million of dollars, or a hundred thousand dollars, or ten thousand dollars, by the results of his own labor; that ten, or twenty, or hundred thousand, or million, or ten million dollars, represent the results of the labors of tens of thousands of persons,—temporarily lodged in the hands of one man. In other words, we say the wealth of an Astor, a Stewart, a Jay Cooke, a Belmont, or a Rothschild is not his own,—that he holds it in trust for the people who gave it to him, that it is his business to see that the community who intrusted to him his possessions should receive a full and ample return for their trust. The conception that wealth is social and not individual, is slowly growing

up. Peter Cooper clearly understands it; Mr. George Peabody lived up to it; even Mr. Stewart, who has the reputation, I can not say how justly, of a close, grasping, and rather mean man, is compelled, by a sense of what is due to public opinion, to build a house for working-women. We all know the angry feeling engendered throughout the community when Commodore Vanderbilt set up a statue of himself. The very brokers in Wall Street had a mock installation of the statue, to show their contempt for the man who would use his wealth for no nobler purpose than to celebrate himself.

Querist. You reject, then, the individual conception of property,—the right of a man to his own?

Positivist. That is the question,—is it his own? We take exception to that whole school of philosophy which finds its root in mere individualism and which proclaims as its doctrine that of "enlightened self-interest." We insist that the true moral law is to "live for others," a basis of principle which we regard as superior to that of Confucius, or even of Christ, for in the highest moral teaching of the latter, condensed in the so-called "golden rule," the measure of your obligations to others was based on what was due to yourself. Positivism, however, insists than in pure morals there is no recognition of self, that the doctrine of duties and not the doctrine of rights should be the governing law of human life.

Querist. How do you expect rich men to act in realizing your conceptions of their duties?

Positivist. Now you ask me a difficult question. When you require the scheme by which these moral conceptions are to be realized, you forestall the future. That is the business of men of great practical ability to determine. It is they who are to say how this wealth with which the rich have been intrusted by society shall be used so as to inure to the greatest good of humanity.

Querist. Would this conception involve charity to the mass of the poor?

Positivist. No, not charity, but justice. However necessary hospitals and asylums may be in our present state of civilization, we think the time should come when they need not exist. We look with suspicion upon the homes, retreats, asylums, alms-houses, and foundling hospitals which modern charity has shown its ability to at once take care of and to degrade the poor. Alms-giving, in any shape, injures both the giver and the receiver, and we can not believe that in a normal state of society there will be any necessity for mere alms. What people want is justice. Without at all attempting to anticipate what these wise practical men will do with their wealth for the benefit of the community, I will make a suggestion. It is this: Suppose it was hinted to A. T. Stewart, Cornelius Vanderbilt, and Robert Bonner that they treat every man and woman in their employ as well as they do their horses. In other words, that the people who have helped to make their wealth, no matter in how humble a capacity, should be as well housed, fed, and groomed, have all the necessaries and some of the luxuries of life, as do the horses in their stables. The present conception of the duties of wealth toward labor is that the payment of wages gets rid of all further obligation,—that when the employee gets his ten or twelve or twenty dollars, that there is an end of all responsibility by the payer to the payee. Such is not the conception of Positivism. Human service, we say, can never be paid by wages; any work which is worth doing, that is done merely with an eye to pecuniary compensation, is work that is very badly done,—that the work itself and its well-doing is the real compensation. Hence we insist that the laborer shall toil for his employer with his whole heart, with an honest pride in his labor, because in his work he lives for others, not for himself. A

good work well done is its own best reward. There is no payment that can get rid of the obligation involved in doing work for others. We insist that the person who profits personally by this work of another should not consider that any money he can pay absolves him from the obligation thereby devolved upon him. See what an enormous change for the better would take place all through society if every rich man was impenetrated with this very obvious conception of his duty; if he realized that he was responsible personally for the care and the comfort of every person in his employ; that the payment of wages on a Saturday night was not the end of his obligation to those who served him and the community so faithfully.

Querist. How can you expect the great mass of selfish capitalists to accept any such line of duty as you indicate? They have made their money generally, if not by hard work, at least by hard bargains, and are naturally, as a rule, men without much generosity of feeling. Their whole lives have been spent in selfish acquisition, and you can not expect them to change their natures, no matter what doctrine you preach.

Positivist. Of one thing I am very certain, that if the capitalist class do not recognize their obligations to the community, one of two things will inevitably take place. Civilization will become the meanest plutocracy the world has ever seen,—a mere government of wealth without moral principle to humanize and control; in other words, the enslavement of the great mass of mankind to exalt men of mere wealth. The soldier who formerly governed did so from ambition, heroism, some inspiration outside of himself,—but the domination of the capitalist class, without any recognition of their social duties, would be the meanest form of government which has ever existed on the face of the earth. The other horn of the dilemma is

that the growth of an enormous poor class, having some education, some aspiration for a better state of life, will bring upon us, throughout all civilization, what we saw recently in Paris,—what the English aristocrat sees and fears in the future of the great *proletaire* class in Great Britain. The millions of starving artisans and agricultural laborers who live their wretched lives within sight of the noble fields and stately castles of the very rich will clamor for communism, and then the rich will heed.

Querist. You see no hope, then, in any of the socialistic schemes or co-operative propositions of which we have heard so much recently?

Positivist. No; none whatever. We reject all these schemes as illusory. We insist that it is impossible for an army to direct its own movements,—it must have a general. We do not believe in Democracy, nor in universal suffrage. We believe these are temporary forms of government leading to the normal state of society, in which the rich will be the rulers of the people as well as the holders of wealth. Co-operation is an attempt to put the cart before the horse. Its success, so far, has been very partial indeed, even as a temporary measure. It has only succeeded in exceptional places in distributing products, but has had scarcely any success productively. That is to say, the famous Rochdale stores, of which we have heard so much, are simply marts in which goods are distributed at cost prices, *plus* the expense of distribution. Even these stores have failed in all the large cities of England, for the reason that the individual proprietor can, in the long run, do better than any corporate enterprise. Business requires just the same faculties that a military chief calls into play—judgment, forethought, ability to form plans and execute them on the instant when they are ripe, to take advantage of circumstances in the markets, and these can never be obtained by committees of ignorant con-

sumers or producers. Every man to his trade. The advantages of the division of labor in industrial pursuits should teach us the impossibility of a mass of men doing any one thing as well as a true leader of men could do it. Co-operation is a step backward in the history of industrialism. The differentiation of the capitalist and the laborer is one of the most valuable results of the modern industrial system. To get rid of the capitalist is to rob us of one of the best results of our industrial era.

Querist. Let me again call your attention to the impossibility of inducing the wealthy men to act as you think they should act?

Positivist. No; it is not impossible. While we give the material power to wealth, we believe in that greater spiritual power which we now vaguely apprehend as public opinion. We know how powerful this is, even in its present unorganized state, in its effect upon individual action. Every woman is afraid of Mrs. Grundy; every man of the opinion of his set, of his social surroundings. The very strongest influences in human nature are those by which we act in the matter of influence upon others. Let the impression become general throughout the civilized world, that the wealthy man lived only for himself, used his wealth only for his personal gratification, and he would soon become infamous,—he could not appear in the street, nor show his equipage, nor live in his house in comfort, because of the weight of the public scorn, were public opinion properly organized. The detestation and hate of the whole community would be brought to bear on this unworthy scion of humanity. His life would become intolerable to him. A Vanderbilt, fifty years from now, will be an impossibility. That is to say, a man who lived simply to gather millions together, without making any noble social use of those millions when accumulated, would be looked upon as a moral monster.

Querist. Do I understand you, then, to object to the present race of Stewarts, Scotts, and Vanderbilts?

Positivist. Not at all. I regard them as among our greatest benefactors. I look upon them as unconsciously, of course, doing an immense social service. Mr. Stewart has, to his especial glory, concentrated trade in one vast establishment. He has introduced the cash system into trade. In olden time the community was taxed excessively to support the great number of stores, the army of clerks, the costly living of the many merchants, and also to pay for the bad debts of the dishonest. But Mr. Stewart, by compelling payment upon the purchase of goods in the retail trade,—by concentrating the dry-goods business in one vast establishment, has sent thousands of clerks and hundreds of merchants into fields where their industry is productive and of value to the community, instead of being mere sponges, sucking up the life of productive industry without giving anything in return. In his store you are sure of a good article at a fair price. So Mr. Vanderbilt, in getting rid practically of swarms of characterless, irresponsible Boards of Directors, has introduced economy, precision, and financial safety into our railway system. The consolidation of roads was foolishly declaimed against by certain would-be economists, while it is really one of the greatest of public benefactions. The issue of it will put our railway system under one management, which I hope will some day be controlled by one man, for then, and not until then, will we have safe and responsible railway management. Mr. Vanderbilt has not, in this matter, acted in the interests of the public, consciously, but in his own. He has done things of which he should be heartily ashamed. The watering of the stock of his roads is pure plunder, and in a normal state of society, with public opinion properly organized, he would not dare to add a dollar to the capital stock of his road

more than was honestly expended in its construction. I have no fears but what, if we can persuade the public that wealth is social and not individual, that the capitalist is but the trustee of the money which is by social laws placed in his hands, the most marvelous changes will be effected in the condition of the poor, that in effect we shall have, in time, no poor,—that every honest man and woman willing to work will never be allowed to stand idle or feel want.

Querist. How do you regard strikes?

Positivist. As necessary evils. If capital had understood its duties, and had acted in accordance with them, there would have been no strikes. If the capitalists had realized that they owed something more to the men who made their wealth for them, beyond the smallest pittance that the poverty of the laborers compelled them to accept, a strike would never have been known; but the selfish conception of "the right of a man to his own," as they call it, —the notion that when you have paid a person as little as he could afford to take for his work, that your obligation is ended,—this has been the parent of all the trouble between capital and labor. As I said before, if capitalists had realized that they owed as much to their laborers as to their horses, these terrible contests of labor and capital would never have been known. We are anxious that these views should be widely disseminated, because we believe that in them is contained the only hope for our civilization, the only possibility of getting rid of the difficulty between capital and labor — and this is indispensable in view of the inevitable accumulation of capital in few hands in all civilized countries,—to end industrial strife, to harmonize interests, to put to use the accumulated wealth of the community for the highest social ends.

Querist. But how can these vast properties be kept

together, with the system obtaining in our democratic community of the equal inheritance of the children?

Positivist. This we regard as a great misfortune. Under the Positivist conception, no man's children have an inherited right to their parents' wealth. There is no natural right about it. The wealth being social, for the use of the community, it should be intrusted, not to the children of the rich, but to that person or those persons who can best use it for the service of humanity. We do not recognize the right of the individual to anything but an education, a business. When a rich man trains up his child and gives it an education, the child can ask no more from him; he has no right to the property,—the property is not his father's to give. Hence we insist that the state should allow the rich man to adopt his successor to carry on his house or his business by the best talent with which he is acquainted. In some instances the son would naturally be the fittest successor to the father, if trained in his business, but not necessarily so. Often it would be the partner or partners who could conduct best the affairs of the great house. When Positivist thought becomes rife, one of our first agitations will be for the right of adoption by the rich, so that their wealth may be transmitted unimpaired to future generations for the benefit of Humanity. The Communist has our conception of the social character of wealth, but his idea is to divide it up among a multitude of people. He has no notion of the continuity of wealth. We say wealth is an inheritance of the past and a trust of the present, which must be transmitted, increased, to the future. Hence, we insist upon individual ownership, with a social conception of the use of wealth; while the Communistic ideal is a great average of humanity, each man with an equal share of the property. This, we think, would be destructive of all civilization, of all the best results of the past, and hence we look with great disfavor

upon schemes of this kind. We are not sorry they are preached, however, because of the necessity for the kind of fear which these men inspire in the rich, to teach the latter a wholesome lesson as to their duty to the community.

Querist. How are you affected toward the Land Reform movement so-called, that is, the agitation looking to the division of the lands and the stoppage of land monopoly?

Positivist. We regard it, of course, with disquietude. There are a few men in this country who are clamoring for the division of land among the poor, and some very eminent men elsewhere are infected with the same notion, notably John Stuart Mill. He wishes that the land in England and Ireland should be divided among the actual workers,—should be taken away from the landlords and given to the poor. Now, we believe that if his scheme were carried out it would be the most grievous curse to England and civilization that the history of the world has any account of. We have an inkling of what the result would be, in the history of France. The one legacy of the revolution in France was the division of the land of the nobles among the peasants. France to-day is a poor country because of that division,—a retrograding country because of that division. The French peasant is a mean-spirited, frugal brute because of that division. The fight to-day between the cities and the country districts of France is the consequence of that division. The little earth the laborer got crushed out his soul. Your rural landholder is, if you please, a frugal man; he has some of the mean and narrow virtues of a rural life, but he has an essentially low and unaspiring mind, and belongs to the reactionary school in politics. The emperor and the priest are always sure of the peasant of France; and if Ireland were to have its land divided in the same way as France, the priest and the emperor would there too, in

time, rule supreme. Hence we reject any such panacea for social ills as the cutting up of the property of the rich and giving it to the poor. We insist that whatever there is retrograde in this country will be found in the rural districts. The flux of American life, the great disposition of the Yankee to change his employment and to enter into trade rather than remain a mere tiller of the soil, these have helped to cover up from us the essential meanness and backwardness of an agricultural population; but certainly some of the most unpromising traits of Yankee character are due to the agricultural training of their fathers. When the conception obtains that all wealth, even wealth in land, is social, that it exists not for the benefit of the individual, but for that of the race, the whole subject resolves itself into a moral one, and is easily settled. Hence, too, we decline to consider the various schemes of the money reformers, those theorizers who wish to get rid of interest, to enlarge the currency, etc. All these are questions that have no real bearing on the problem which is *the social character of all human work and its results.*

CONVERSATION NINTH.

Querist. What is the Positivist solution of the woman question?

Positivist. We reject the current theories of woman's rights, as indeed we repudiate the whole doctrine of human rights and substitute therefor the conception of human duty. In considering the relations of woman to society, true to the scientific basis of Positivism, we refer at once to the biological laws which control the sexes. Clearly, it is the office of the adult woman to bear and rear the child. This is her peculiar function as a woman. The continuance of the race is committed mainly to her charge. Now, we insist that the female should not be asked to bear and rear the child and to work also. The notion at present agitating the most advanced of the sex in Europe and America is that women should enter every kind of employment, the same as men, of course taking into account the physical difference of the two sexes. But it is clear that if all women work the same as men, the continuance of the race will become a secondary consideration. The working-woman, using the title in the same sense as the working-man, can not be a good mother. It is too much to ask of the woman, to be a worker, a producer, subject to all the emergencies and vicissitudes of the labor field, and, at the same time, to expect her to bear children. Hence Auguste Comte laid it down as a rule, that the woman, the mother of the race, should be exempt from physical toil outside the family—that she should be supported by man; that no male, with the consciousness of the strength and ability of his own sex, should ask the woman with whom he consorted, to work as he did, and at the same time to bear his children. To continue her

proper work effectually she should be released from the ruder cares of life, and especially from the hardening influences of daily labor. Of course there are exceptional women—women who are childless; those who have strong artistic and literary tastes; born orators, actors, nurses; women who are past the child-bearing age. Of these should be exacted some useful work, or they should be allowed to follow their several inclinations; but the mother should be taken care of, should not work, except at such light employments as ordinary household occupation would give her.

Querist. In what way does the Positivist regard the marriage system?

Positivist. Auguste Comte was, on this point, more conservative than even the Roman Catholic usage called for. He recognized but one cause for divorce, and that was not adultery. It was where the husband has been declared infamous by the law, has been designated an unworthy member of the community, one to whom it would be wrong to commit the care of a wife or the moral training of children. Indeed, Comte was so strict in his conception of the relation of husband and wife, that he insisted a true marriage should last forever, that neither should ever re-marry, even in the event of the death of his or her partner. He did not, of course, suppose that—even if what he conceived to be the normal state of society should ever be realized—this conception would be fully carried out; but he did expect that the finer specimens of the race, the noble men and women of the future, would decline to form a second alliance after the death of the first wife or husband. He was of the opinion that such touching devotion as was shown in the past by Petrarch to Laura, by Dante to Beatrice, and in our own day by John Stuart Mill to the memory of his dead wife, would then become common. His ideas respecting divorce were

founded upon his conception of duty, and were also derived from a study of the relations of the parents to their young. In the animal creation, the birds and beasts usually remain together until their young are able to shift for themselves. This is the general rule throughout the animal kingdom, to which, of course, there are some exceptions. In our most advanced society there is now a recognition of the desirability of the influence of both father and mother upon the child, which would be quite out of the question in a community where divorces are frequent. Re-marriage necessarily involves the loss to the child of the care of one or the other parent, and subjects it to the caprices and often the dislike of the new partner in the marriage relation. Every one of us can realize the misery resulting from the relations of stepmother and stepfather to the child, and under the Positivist scheme such family discomforts would be discountenanced. If, then, the human pair were to aim at no higher standard than the morality of the brutes in relation to their offspring, they would remain together until the maturity of their first young, say twenty years. But, in the mean time, other children are usually born, which brings the age of the parents up to sixty years at least before they are released from obligation to their children. Even the most insane reformer of the marriage relation would not argue in favor of old couples of sixty years being divided by law, or that freedom from the marriage tie should commence at that age. Hence, practically by observing the simplest rules of duty toward the young, marriage is indissoluble, except by the death of one or the other of the partners; and then, as Comte pointed out, if there was that devotion to the memory of the other partner which married couples should entertain, the thought of a second marriage would be repulsive to the right thinking man or woman, as it is to the great woman's champion, John Stuart Mill.

Querist. As I have heretofore understood you, you say that the Positivist accepts accomplished facts, observes the course of society, and conforms thereto. Now, is it not obvious that since the Reformation down to the present time, the course of legislation has constantly tended toward the so-called freedom of the affections to easier and still easier divorce?

Positivist. That is undoubtedly true. Every legal enactment upon the subject of marriage, since the time of the Reformation, has tended to loosen the bonds of matrimony,—indeed the Reformation itself, both in Germany and England, was largely made up of people restive under the restraints of the old church in this regard. This was the case with both Martin Luther and Henry VIII. Every new departure from the *régime* of the Catholic Church has been promptly followed by enactments favoring or admitting of divorce, and getting nearer and nearer to the ideal of freedom preached by our modern marriage reformers. This tendency we admit and deplore, and we insist that it is one of the baleful results of the metaphysical era of thought through which we have passed, and from which we are but just emerging,—that it follows logically from the doctrine of human rights preached by the metaphysicians and legists, which we regard as without any basis in the constitution of man and society. When science points out the laws we should obey, we will find that marriage will be put upon a very different footing, and that the course of legislation and public opinion will not be toward looser unions, but closer ones; not to free divorce, but the institution of an indissoluble tie, a union for life. The metaphysical era has been essentially critical and destructive. It was the natural solvent of old institutions,—a period of transition and anarchy, and was necessary to provide the materials for a reconstruction of society. In this respect, its use still continues, and the

so-called reformers of the age are merely destructive. The schools of thought, in this country and Europe, which call themselves liberal and rational, have thus far been engaged entirely in tearing down, not in building up. This has been as true with respect to marriage as of every other institution touched by them, and we must expect that, for a time, this disintegrating process will continue. It is already bearing bitter fruit in this country, in the disruption of families, the loosening of the ties between husband and wife, in diminishing the sense of responsibility for the care of children, and in weakening the whole tone of sexual morality throughout the nation.

Querist. Let me understand you more definitely: Is it the Positivist belief that, in the reaction from this tendency, something analogous to the old Roman Catholic conception of marriage is to be reinstated in civilized society?

Positivist. No. The old Catholic conception of marriage was that of a sacrament, an institution of God; that is, a revelation of a Power outside of us for our guidance and care. That notion served a good purpose in its day. Indeed, without it, the progress of society would have been impossible; but marriage in the future will be regarded from a purely human standpoint. The considerations with the sociologists will be, "What form should this institution take to best minister to the wants of the race?" and "How can it best be made to secure the happiness of persons taking upon themselves the responsibilities of this relation?" Clearly, in considering this matter, the scientists who will have it in charge will consider, first, as of prime importance, "How is the race to be best continued?" The haphazard way in which children are now born would not be tolerated in a scientifically constructed society. They come now as the offspring of lust, of chance, of accident. With the evidences all about us

of the value of forethought, of care, of wise human providence in the perfecting of animals and plants, it will be inevitable that these same wise human precautions will be taken in the propagation of children. How this is to be done we do not pretend to say; but that the continuance of the race should not be left to the ignorant, the vicious, to chance and lust, is so clear that we are sure that in the future constitution of society this matter will be altogether reformed,—that those whose physical and moral constitutions are such that they should not continue the race will be prevented from doing so by a wise public opinion, and that to the physically and morally sound will be committed the business of peopling the earth.

Querist. Do you find any warrant for this in Comte's writings?

Positivist. Not in express words, but the whole tenor and scope of the Positivist philosophy point to that result. Indeed I, for one, am in some doubt with regard to the programme which Comte has put forth on this question, even while agreeing with my fellow co-religionists in advocating it as the best scheme of which we at present have any knowledge. It is the ennobling and idealizing of the marriage and family relation as we find it in civilization, which Comte urges. Monogamy is undoubtedly the institution under which the best specimens of the race have been born, and all civilized nations adopt it instinctively. It may be that the future will develop some form of marriage of which we now know practically nothing, but we must not anticipate the future. Our business is to accept the present and do the best we can with the materials in our possession,—hence the monogamic conception of marriage being more altruistic, less selfish, conforming to the present and past morality on the subject, we give it our unhesitating adhesion, even though we may suspect that the future has something better in store for

us. Here let me remark that many of the schemes of the Positivists are necessarily provisional. Like all scientists, as soon as a certain set of phenomena are before us we form an hypothesis to account for them. Further discoveries, informing us of a different set of phenomena, may necessitate another hypothesis—but finally some general theory, embracing all the phenomena, based upon and supported by all, settles the question forever. An illustration of this is found in Geology. At first, from the evidences of watery formation in every part of the globe, the aqueous theory of the origin of the earth was propounded, and for a time did very well. It explained a great many facts. Subsequently, evidences of igneous origin were also found in every direction, and then it was supposed that the world was born of fire. But a further and higher generalization showed that both fire and water were active agents in producing the world as it is, and so Geology advances from minor hypotheses to larger generalizations,—from those which while true were still not the whole truth,—until finally the science will arrive at some such point of perfection as Astronomy has now reached. The process has been the same with reference to human institutions. We generalize the phenomena as they are presented to us, and are ready to form new theories and new schemes as additional facts are found which it is necessary to incorporate into the general scheme. We abhor the kind of license now preached by our marriage reformers. It is purely earthly, sensual, and devilish,—looks only to the gratification of the individual,—aims only at a riot of the passions with whatever honeyed phrases its advocates endeavor to cloak it and conceal its true character. No form of marriage can be permanent that is not altruistic, that does not involve self-surrender, that does not place a higher valuation on the dignity of the mutual relation and the welfare of the child

than upon the gratification of the individual. We have no patience with the men and women who, under a cover of fine phrases and euphemisms, preach the so-called doctrine of free love. There is no such thing as free love. All love should be subordinate to high human uses. That which is advocated is merely free lust.

Querist. What have you to say with regard to Comte's notions respecting the right of woman to hold property?

Positivist. He argued that woman should not be allowed the possession of property, should have no right to dower, and the reasons he adduced therefor were wise and good. It was to prevent mercenary marriages, to prohibit in the future the union of the old and the young, and so secure a better human progeny. Under the *régime* that he indicated, women were taken care of, were not to labor, were to be supported by the toil of the man, and hence, being in possession of all the necessaries and some, at least, of the comforts of life, and these secured to her, there would be no object in woman's having property of her own. Women do very well in the small economies of life, but it is very rare that they achieve great fortunes, or are wise in the disposition of them. The kindly, loving character of women should not be tampered with and made hard, coarse, and unsympathetic as the amassers and owners of large properties are apt to become,—indeed, must become, in order to retain their great possessions. The capitalists must be saving and selfish to hold what they have obtained. Hence, for the good of the race and for her own good, woman is, in the Positivist scheme, if you please so to denominate her position, a dependent.

Querist. Would this not give rather a low conception of the function of woman?

Positivist. Not at all. In our ideal of society the Woman is worshiped. Humanity is represented by her, and as mother, wife, sister, and daughter we do literally wor-

ship her. We idealize woman, relieve her of all care and devote our lives to her welfare. How much nobler a conception is this, than that woman should work side by side with man, should be the possessor of property, and to become so, should struggle and scramble with man for wealth and material power. As Comte very well says, "If earth were the fabled heaven of the Christian Utopia, woman's superiority in goodness over man would make her the best person to rule;" but as we do not live in Utopia, but in a hard world, where subsistence is with difficulty extracted from the soil, it is the muscle, the hard practical talent of man, which must bear the sway. The man, therefore, goes to the front in the battle of life. The place of woman is in the rear,—there is no help for it,—it is one of the fatalities of our earthly existence. Woman can rule man only through his affections, and must submit to his authority in matters of wealth, of labor, and of practical life.

CONVERSATION TENTH.

Querist. In reading the comments of various English and French authors upon Auguste Comte, I find that his science of society is described as arbitrary, as something projected out of his own inner consciousness, yet I see that you do not so regard it, but that you think the various plans which occurred to him result from the normal constitution of man in society.

Positivist. Yes; we so regard it. We repudiate entirely the notion that the schemes which he propounded were mere arbitrary creations of his own mind. Comte always had a complete justification in the constitution of human nature itself for even the most extraordinary de-

partures from the apparent order of things which he proposed. With him, the present was derived immediately from the past, and the future naturally grew out of the present. In other words, he repudiated absolutely all schemes which commenced *de novo*, from the individual himself, without thought of the past or the present. Reformers—nearly all the Communists and Socialists notably so—have derived their schemes of society from ideal and abstracted conceptions of human rights and human perfectibility. While they aim to redress wrongs which do undoubtedly exist, they are unpractical by reason of neglecting to take cognizance of society as constituted, and not understanding that present institutions are simply the outgrowth of those of the past, and that any scheme which looks to the future must make allowances for the present tendencies of society. The twentieth century must be evolved out of the nineteenth, and whatever institutions will flourish then are rudimentary to-day. Mill has admitted that Auguste Comte was the creator of the philosophy of history: the conception did not exist before his time, and he not only conceived of such a philosophy, and made it possible, but he also was its first exponent. To charge him with overlooking the influence of the present upon the future, is to forget the immense service he has rendered to philosophy by that splendid conception.

Querist. How do you account for these misconceptions to which you say he is subjected by the leading writers of England, France, and America who have written about him?

Positivist. In this way: Had Comte been able to wait until the completion of his system before he published his works, it is probable that he would not have been so misconceived; but his first great publication was his "Philosophie Positive." This was immediately judged upon its

merits by the leading scientists of Europe, and it was so much in advance of the thought current at that time that it only received the adhesion, often but partial, of a few of the then living philosophers. Among them were some very eminent names, such as John Stuart Mill, Grote the historian, George Henry Lewes, M. Littré, Sir W. Molesworth, and other leading thinkers and writers. These partial or entire advocates of the Positivist philosophy found themselves in a measure compelled to defend their positions. They did so on inadequate grounds, not realizing the greatness of Comte's genius or the vastness of his discoveries. When his second great work was published, his "Politique Positive," they were astonished to find that those vast generalizations which Comte had in his first book confined to science and history, he had now applied to religion and morality, or, in a word, to sociology. It so happened that most of those writers had naturally belonged to the various metaphysical schools in existence prior to the propagation of Comte's philosophy, and were full of the irreverence and distrust of religion which the literature of modern Europe has made popular among advanced thinkers. They were astonished; more than that, they were disquieted, and even alarmed, and loudly protested that while they accepted, in a measure, the Positive philosophy, they rejected entirely the Religion of Humanity as being alien to it, and as a departure from the true method to be pursued in philosophy. In other words, they claimed that Comte had himself gone back upon all his previous labors and had deserted the objective for the subjective method. The great difficulty in the way is, that Comte is probably a hundred years ahead of his time. His was too vast a mind to be thoroughly comprehended by his own immediate age. The old Greek story will suggest itself to you, of the two sculptors who were contending for the honor of placing the statue of Zeus upon the Parthenon. The

work of one was a finely lined, beautifully formed, and finished figure; the other, viewed near at hand, was a rude, apparently shapeless mass of stone. The sculptor who formed the latter was loudly condemned by the ignorant populace; but when the trial came, and the small statue was placed on the dizzy height, it could not be seen; while the apparently shapeless mass revealed its true grandeur of conception and magnificence of execution only when lifted to that height which softened and harmonized its outlines. So it is with Comte. His proportions are so vast, so massive, that this age, and perhaps the next, will not do him full justice. He is so immeasurably superior to every other philosopher of this century, that they have yet to learn how great he is in proportion to them, or rather, they will never learn it, but their descendants a hundred years from now will do so. We regard him as being probably the greatest brain and heart that this planet has ever seen.

Querist. Is there not danger that this feeling may degenerate into something like personal idolatry?

Positivist. No, there is no danger under the Positivist system of making any man a God. The glory of the Religion of Humanity is that it admits its own imperfections. Progress is one of its laws. We are discovering new harmonies, new unities every day, and there is no danger of our degenerating into any mere man worship, or taking every word of Comte as being inspired. Undoubtedly the science and philosophy of the future will be as much superior to his as his was to that which preceded him; — but we insist that, as yet, civilization has not reached the height that he marked out for it, and it is idle to talk of a beyond when even he is not properly understood by the best minds of the age, nor, indeed, can he be.

Querist. You do not look, then, for the acceptance of

the Positivist philosophy and religion among the most educated and cultured classes?

Positivist. No; no religion ever yet, that has been of vital worth to the race, has commenced among the cultured and wealthy classes, but is always the offspring of the common earth of humanity, those whom Mr. Lincoln called the "plain people." A new religion, to be vital, must have its roots in the soil. It can not commence to grow from the branches downward. Hence, we do not aim to get at the wealthy, the professional, or the so-called educated classes. Positivism has a great affinity for the working classes, and it is they who have the first essential right to a knowledge of its principles and aims. Its purpose is, as the Religion of Humanity, to incorporate the *proletaires* into the social order, to make them a part of the life of the time. Hence in England we find the most active adherents of the cause of the working classes to be our advanced Positivists, those who believe in the Religion of Humanity. In the contest between capital and labor, they invariably take the side of labor.

Querist. A word again on the woman question. In what way does the school of Comte differ from that of Herbert Spencer upon this problem, especially with reference to the relations between the sexes?

Positivist. We do not, as yet, exactly know what Mr. Herbert Spencer's position upon this question really is, and we very much doubt if he himself knows. It is very certain that the position he took in his "Social Statics," in regard to the rights of woman, he has since very greatly modified. His sociology, we are inclined to believe, will give very different results from those embodied by him in former works. At present, the reformers of marriage—the believers in woman's rights so-called—look hopefully on Herbert Spencer as their great apostle; but we can not see how he can avoid reaching substantially the same con-

clusions as Auguste Comte has, as he pursues farther his scientific studies. Some years ago he admitted his very great ignorance of the writings of Comte, and he made a mistake, as we think, in criticising him while confessedly ignorant of the views which the Master had propounded. For his noted criticism upon Comte's "History of the Sciences," he was himself, in turn, severely criticised by Mill, Lewes, Littré, and by nearly all who gave attention to the subject. Spencer has a few ill-informed adherents in this country, even on that point, but they are of very little account. Spencer's personal experience has not been so varied as that of Comte, for the latter knew both the bliss of a happy love and the misery of an unfortunate marriage, while Spencer is a bachelor, and what his heart-experiences have been no one knows. So far, his writings would seem to identify him with the individualistic school; but if his sociology is to be of any value, he can not remain in that position. The very biological law upon which he has insisted with so much force must make him a sociologist in the Comtean sense. By the terms of that law, as objects or institutions differentiate, they also integrate—that is to say, as the homogeneous object becomes heterogeneous, the mass of which it is composed becomes integrated. Now, the universal statement of the individualists is, that you must get rid of government or control as the individual perfects. They see but half the truth. As the organism becomes more heterogeneous, more differentiated, it also becomes more highly vitalized. The jelly-fish is a mere pulp of gelatinous substance—it is almost without life; but as we ascend through the gradations of animal life, forms increase in complexity, new functions cause newly required organs to appear, and the organization becomes more highly vitalized, more perfected. It is this integration which Spencer and Mill, and that whole school, have overlooked; and when they point out in society the

individualizing or differencing of structures, they have forgotten the other part of the biological law, which shows that, with this differentiation, a higher integration takes place. Man shows the possession of a mass of functions which the lower animals have not, but then man is a far more integrated being than the lower forms from which he sprang. So, take our own government and compare it to the simple patriarchism of early times, and it exceeds that simpler form as much in its integration, in its power, in its ability, in its faculty for doing things, as it does in the vast variety of functions to which it gives birth. Instead of the law of liberty being developed by the evolution of humanity in its various stages of progress, we could generalize, if we pleased, a law of subordination, and would say that for every new function there is a new limitation. The worm, with a single intestine, is subject to far fewer conditions of life than the highly organized man. In like manner, the despotism controlled by a single will is under fewer restraints than is the highly civilized and integrated American republic. In the former, one will is the only law; but in our multifariously complex structure of government, man is surrounded by a host of limitations unknown to the savage under the direct control of his despotic chief. We have not only national, but State, city, county, and township laws. Not satisfied with these, we have our voluntary associations. We belong to a church—more law; to a Masonic or Odd Fellows' lodge —more law, more limitations of individual liberty. Indeed, your very decriers of law and insisters upon absolute freedom of the individual are compelled to form organizations, which imply more law, to preach their disintegrating doctrines. The political economist who declaims against all forms of government, is compelled to form one and subject himself to personal limitations to publish his folly. To our mind, the attitude of that whole school,

in view of the law of life, that of evolution, which was pointed out by Spencer himself, is simply preposterous. Theirs is the most insane cry of the age. Their howls for "freedom," for absence from governments, for getting rid of restrictions, when the very supposition of a highly organized, differentiated structure also includes the idea of one highly integrated, and, as such, necessarily subject to a new set of limitations for every new element of differentiation which occurs in the structure, are not only baneful in the extreme, but so absolutely illogical as to be ridiculous.

CONVERSATION ELEVENTH

Querist. Have you any different notion of government from that usually entertained in free communities?

Positivist. The peculiarity of our whole scheme of man's life on this planet is that we regard humanity as a whole, and reject the so-called sovereignty of the individual. The individual, with us, is an abstraction—he does not exist, he is a mere cell in the entire organism. In St. Paul's noble language, we are simply "members of one body;" this is a true biological statement of man's relations to the race. We are not monads, self-existent; we are what the past has made us. Scarcely an atom of which we are composed is exclusively our own; the very language in which we declare our independence and insist on our individuality belies us, for it was invented for us by other people. The bees in the hive represent the Positivist conception of government; if it is necessary for the good of the hive that the drones should be killed, killed they must be; they but live for the community, the community does not exist for them. We wish to emphasize

this statement as a corrective to the exaggerated individualism preached by the present race of metaphysical philosophers, such, for instance, as Emerson and his Boston followers. These people are doing a great disservice to their kind in insisting upon the exaltation of the egoistic faculties at the expense of the social sympathies, thus keeping out of sight the dependence of each member of the community upon the whole body. Yet, as a matter of course, by the very biological law which recognizes that integration keeps pace with differentiation, we insist that it is in the completeness of the whole that the individual finds *his* completeness; in other words, that the perfection, for instance, of the human body would be in the differentiation of every one of its parts. It is as absurd to exalt the individual above society, above government, or above humanity, as it would be to insist upon exaggerating the importance of the finger or toe above all the rest of the body; its true glory is in its entire subordination to the good of the whole, and the preachers of individualism are disseminators of anarchy and misrule, they are real enemies of the human race.

Querist. I notice that some of Herbert Spencer's disciples in this country seem to believe that all visible facts and modes of the universe are but modifications of one central force.

Positivist. It is clear that our conceptions of matter or force are purely anthropomorphic; that is, they are phenomena which we must express in terms of human consciousness. Spencer, I believe, says matter is the objective of what force is the subjective conception. Now, it may be useful for us to employ those terms in ordinary *parlance*, but we should never forget that they are mere words, that these notions are purely human, and that when we talk of force we are simply getting another name in the place of the old anthropomorphic God. All

we know of matter or force is in the relations of each to human consciousness, that is, in the mental stimuli resulting from the changes which occur in the world about us. We know of the correlation of forces, but we can know nothing of force in itself, or matter in itself; nor do we know that matter or force exists outside of human consciousness. Physicists who use these two terms are repeating the old mistake of the Medieval Realists, of confounding human conceptions with real existences. We can not know Force any more than we can know God,—the very term is a figure of the imagination and of speech.

Querist. I notice that the Boston Radical Club and the New England transcendentalists generally confine most of their debates to questions regarding God and immortality. Is there any value whatever in discussions of this character?

Positivist. We think not. We regard all discussions concerning the character and nature of a personal God as being evidences of the childishness of the race and of the philosophy which professes to represent it. Your little boy or girl will ask you questions which no philosopher can answer. The child will ask you, "Who was God's father?" and "where does God live?" The ingenuity of these little people in puzzling their parents has long been known and understood. Discussions respecting the Divine Immanence, Pantheism, the nature of Deity, are all evidences of the essential childishness of the intellects of their originators and participants. The myth of Babel, the fable of men's attempt to scale heaven by building an immense tower, very well exhibits the futility of men trying to know the unknowable. The old story of the Titans piling mountain upon mountain in order to reach the clouds conveys a lesson which the Boston Radical Club would do well to take to heart. As the child becomes older, he refrains from troubling himself and his parents with attempts

at solving insolvable mysteries, and finding himself surrounded by a world where a great many things can be known, applies his mind to more fruitful studies. When science has done so much for man, and so much still remains to be done that can be accomplished, it is not only idle and childish, but it is positively wicked for philosophers and clergymen to be pottering and mumbling over these old dreams and illusions—questions which belong only to the infancy of the race, and about which men never have been, and never will be, able to arrive at any satisfactory result. There is not a phase of all the dispute respecting God or Immortality which has not been thought out by the Hindoo sages three thousand years ago. We are simply repeating in our modern discussions on these subjects the thoughts which the Hindoos had worked out hundreds of generations since. This introspective vision, this formulating of subjective conceptions, uncorrected by objective realities, has been going on ever since man emerged from the brute life, and the result is *nil.* It amounts to nothing. These studies, while undoubtedly of value as a species of mental gymnastics in times past, must be no longer tolerated. A healthy public opinion will sternly discountenance them. The man who bores you with discourse on the nature of the Godhead must be promptly given to understand that he is talking nonsense, that he is a big baby, and if he wishes to retain a status among men he must "put away childish things," that his effort is simply a waste of time and cerebral power. The philosophy of all modern schools, even the most conservative, now reject as idle all ontological studies.

Querist. How about the conception of evil and the devil? What solution has Positivism of the origin of evil?

Positivist. The devil and the conception of evil are, like the conception of God, purely human or anthropomor-

phitic. Modern science rejects the notion of a personal devil, or an entity known as evil. What we really know is that the human organism has a certain environment which sometimes injures it,—that we call evil. A stone bruises a man, a tree falls upon and crushes him, he tumbles into the water and is drowned. In these cases the environment of antagonistic nature was too much for the organism and it has been injured, or perhaps it may be that the organism did not come into the world fully prepared to battle with its environment, and hence succumbs to its surroundings. Now, it was natural enough that the savage man, seeing on every side things which injured him, should have, as was his wont, turned this environment of danger into a spirit, which he abstracted from the thing itself, and made it a fiend, a wrathful God, or devil of illimitably malific purpose, and this subjective, unreal conception has come down to our own day. Indeed, postulating a God who is perfect, almighty, a thoroughly good God, it is impossible to get rid of the kindred conception of a devil. If there is a good Deity in one case, there must be a bad one in the other, for how else would you account for diseases, wars, earthquakes, and all the multiplied forms of human misery, with your all-perfect and almighty God, without he becomes a devil at once if he permits these things? Indeed, the whole conception of a pure, good Deity reigning over a world in which sentient beings suffer intolerable agonies, is monstrously illogical. The old theologians, who believed in both God and the Devil, were far wiser in their generation than the modern Deists and Unitarians, who accept the conception of a perfect and almighty God, yet reject the notion of a hurtful spirit of darkness,—because the latter would account for the imperfection in the world as well as the other would account for the harmonies of the universe. The fact is, that neither conception is correct, that evil is a term which is as rela-

tive as good, that it relates to human organisms, or to what is or is not hurtful to life, and which can be readily understood by a true scientific conception. Dirt is well said to be "matter out of place." Soil scattered about a dainty, costly house is a nuisance, but in a garden it nourishes beautiful flowers. The river-bottom, with its waste vegetable corruption, scatters disease and death among mankind, but it also helps to perfect in richest profusion the plants which furnish the food of the race. The waste of the manure heap is noisome to the neighborhood, but it is life to the cereal and the fruit. Evil may therefore be said to be good misplaced or misunderstood. Put things in their proper relations to humanity and there is no evil. The doctrine of Evolution explains the imperfection which meets us at every turn in life, and the lesson that it teaches us is, that we must rely, not upon a Divine, but upon a Human Providence to correct the ills of life, to get rid of that which is detrimental to humanity. There is no such thing as absolute evil *per se*. We are, it is true, surrounded by certain fatalities which we can not overcome,—trouble, difficulties, prostrating heat, storms, earthquakes, pestilences, barren lands; but man is getting control, more and more, of the forces about him, and is becoming a real Providence to himself. There is no need of war. When children are well born, disease will, ere long, be in great measure got rid of,—the drainage of low lands drives away the poisonous malaria. In short, if the adjustment were properly made and maintained between the human organism and its environment, the former would have a happy life and a painless death; and to accomplish this is the problem now before the race on this planet. Humanity, the God of this globe, must dominate over it, must make use of all its forces for the benefit of her children, and this is the aim of Positivism,—the destination of all science and all human effort for the good of man.

Querist. Have you any explanation of the old differences between the notion of "fate" and the theory of "free-will?"

Positivist. Those also are mere words. As I have just said, we are surrounded by and subject to certain fatalities. We can not live more than a certain number of years—by all that we can do we can not add an inch to our stature. If we jump out of a window we will break our neck or legs; if we fall into the river we are in danger of being drowned. We are overshadowed in our material life by certain tremendous fatalities which we can not get rid of. There are really unpardonable sins which we can commit against our organism. If we injure it so as to destroy its integrity, no praying or care afterward will be of any avail; but in the complexity of the phenomena which control our life there is a large measure of use of human activity and will. We can adapt ourselves to the secondary laws of human life. So far, free-will comes into play,—by obeying Nature, we conquer her. That is, by submitting to the inevitable requirements of our environment, we can lead comparatively painless and, in a sense, happy lives, if the integrity of our individual organism has not been injured. The evolution of the race from a lower order of animals, the contest which man has had with the rude forces of nature about him, the great achievements manifested on every side, the results of his labor, enterprise, energy, and knowledge, give a fair ground for a hope that, by a wise adaptation to his surroundings, man may perform wonders of which he has now no conception. The whole earth may be regenerated, the race so improved as to realize all that is valuable in the fabled dreams of the life hereafter.

CONVERSATION TWELFTH.

Querist. You do not, then, accept Comte unqualifiedly?

Positivist. In the work of every person there is an individual element which it is perfectly competent to eliminate without at all injuring the superstructure constructed by him. Such was, in my opinion, Comte's view as to the present limits of scientific inquiry. Any one may be a Positivist, and, as the phrase goes, a "complete" Positivist, without accepting these limitations at all.

Querist. Why, how is that?

Positivist. Well, simply in this way. The limitations were dictated by what Comte called the good of Humanity. Now, if it can be shown that the attainment of this object is furthered by the rejection of a single expedient thought to be necessary for that purpose, Comte himself would be the first to counsel its abandonment. The great thing to be kept in view constantly is the good of Humanity. This is the unchangeable principle, and the means by which it is to be attained are always desiderata.

Querist. Be a little more definite in your answer.

Positivist. In his "Philosophie Positive," Comte himself has said that there was but one way to avert the disasters of the dispersiveness of our savans, caused by the very minute division of labor in the scientific domain. And this was by carrying it one step farther and making a great special class, whose duties it should be to study and co-ordinate the generalities discovered by others. You will remember that this is one of the Comtean principles accepted by Mr. Spencer, and it must be acknowledged that the world is indebted to him for endeavoring as far as possible to carry it out. Comte also at the same time divided the scientific domain into two great tracts, the

one abstract and general, the other concrete and particular; the former conversant with the great laws of phenomena, the latter with their individual facts. The abstract sciences were in course of rapid construction, but the concrete sciences, on account of having to depend upon the combined laws of two or more of those sciences, were hardly more than foreseen. Contemplating the abstract and general more exclusively, and gaining a clearer conception of the overpowering utility of a great abstract science of Humanity, there can be no question that Comte in time hardly appreciated at their true value the concrete sciences, of whose construction he had spoken so hopefully in his earlier work, and in the "Politique Positive" actually condemned their study as being likely never to lead to any useful result. A very few considerations will make apparent that perhaps the scientific specialists of the present day are in part right in pursuing these studies, and the founder of Positivism in part wrong in counseling their abandonment.

Querist. What are those considerations?

Positivist. Humanly considered, the earth must always appear as it did to early man, the center of the universe. This center, of course, is not objective but subjective—not physical, but human. Now, if we would modify this house of ours for the good of the race, we must know its physical laws and their causes. Every one is aware that though our atmosphere has been studied for unnumbered ages, we still have no proper science of meteorology. The real difficulty is that we do not know what part of the disturbances to trace to purely mundane causes and what part to astronomical causes. Late researches have shown that there is a positive connection between the number and area of sun "spots" and the intensity of terrestrial magnetism; and a magnetic shower has been actually detected by the instruments at Kew at the same time that

the heliograph pictured a more than usually large number of dark spots on the face of the sun. Now, who is prepared to condemn this inquiry into the intimate constitution of the sun upon the score of the good of Humanity, if it can be shown that only by its means can a complete knowledge of our own earth be rendered possible? But this is not all. The good of the race has been furthered by this inquiry in a direct manner. "Spectrum Analysis" is now, and will become still more so, one of the most potent modes of interrogating nature. In the Bessemer steel-making process it has been used to the saving of large sums, and the production of a finer article, and metals have been detected by it the presence of which may be of great future utility to the race. It is well known, too, that by the spectroscope can be detected the presence of that burning envelope around the sun, the projecting flames of which sometimes reach 80,000 and often 100,000 miles in height, and roll on with an enormous rapidity. Fanciful as it may appear, no one is able yet to say that these flames—their altitude, velocity, chemical composition, etc.—have not some marked effect upon the disturbances of our earth, which are known to us as storms or earthquakes.

Querist. You think, then, that observation, not theory, should decide the question?

Positivist. Precisely so. And not only as far as the sun is concerned, but the same rule should apply to the remote stars, vaguely known as the sidereal system. We can not yet tell but some of the nearest and largest "suns," for they are such, exert an appreciable effect upon the center of our system, and through it upon its component members. Comte himself acknowledged that the only reason why the moderns abandoned theological and metaphysical systems was their confessed impotence and inutility. And though many have tried to go deeper as they call it, no better reason has yet been given. The same rule should

and must apply to these studies. As yet their impotence has not been shown, and they give promise of great fruitfulness. Consequently no conclusive reason yet exists for giving them up.

Querist. Did not Comte include Geology in his condemnation? and what have you to say about it?

Positivist. Comte did include Geology in that condemnation, and a slight extension of previous remarks will meet its case. The great doctrine of the continuity of organic species and man, upon which our great philosopher so much insisted, depends at least for its base upon the results of Geology. Darwin's biological researches are the direct outcome of Lyell's geological discoveries and reasonings. Doubtless this science is still crude in its generalizations, but not by any means so much so as when Comte wrote. But this can never be alleged as a reason for the discontinuance of its study. We all know of what assistance it has been in mining operations, and when the new views upon what may be called the Economy of the planet, derived from solar sources, come to be applied and generalized, there is no telling how important its empirical results may become. Even now it is evident to every thinking person that a current of electricity or terrestrial magnetism must be changed in direction or perhaps modified in intensity according to the direction and composition of the strata of rocks traversed by it. There can be no doubt that with further study, more such uses of knowledge, which appears at first sight to be useless, will come to light.

Querist. Still another point should have a little light thrown upon it. How do you reconcile this teaching with Comte's own laments over the *élite* of the race wasting their time in these vain studies, when they might be contributing their part to the immediate solution of the social problem?

Positivist. Certainly the solution of the social problem or problems, for there are many of them, is the greatest necessity of our time, and we are all anxious for its attainment, and all look in the same direction as did Comte for this solution. But it is not by any means clear (1) that these efforts are not contributing toward this wished-for consummation; or (2) that the men who are laboring in these walks would be fitted for the appropriate solution of purely sociological questions. Reasons have been previously given for thinking that these efforts, dispersive as they must be acknowledged to be, are really useful, and that they will at no distant day be productive of great and permanent good to the race. The second point is one upon which there is a great deal of misconception, and upon which, therefore, a little elaboration may not be thrown away. It is one of the evils of the day that employments are "chosen"—if it is not a bull to use that word—haphazard. There is no mode of finding out what a man is fitted for except "trial and failure," and thus often the best years of life are wasted in vain endeavors to do the impossible. This scene is enacted before all of us many times during our lives, and leaves not a doubt that the mental as well as the physical constitution of each individual is specially fitted for some one work, and that there are limitations on all sides, even to the greatest genius. For instance, it is not by any means certain that Sir Isaac Newton, great as he was in his own line, and fundamentally similar as are all the parts of scientific method, could have become a great social philosopher, even if public opinion, family influence, or what is vaguely called accident, had compelled him to follow that line. Taking a great philosopher of the present day, —Mr. Spencer,—and there is no reason for thinking that he could ever have become as great, relatively, as a mathematician, or, indeed, as a specialist of any kind, as he has as a co-ordinator of

generalities. But the point is too clear to need further elucidation. It may be asserted, generally, that few of those scientists who are now pursuing those studies which are in dispute would contribute anything to the immediate removal of the social difficulties, even if all of them were laboring in its domain.

Querist. You then propose to allow individual preference to decide the matter?

Positivist. We have to do so yet, but it is individual preference controlled by a sense of the permanent good of the race, and it is to be hoped that the Positive system of instruction will point out a better mode of selecting our teachers. There is another point not to be overlooked with regard to sociological inquiries and inquirers. The latter are not by any means so few as is sometimes thought. Very many have reflected long and seriously upon the subject, and one great point gained is, that there appears to be a convergence in their results which was entirely wanting a few years ago. This convergence, it must be acknowledged, is the result of the Positive mode of inquiry which is in the air, and not of any copying, to any extent at least, from the great inquirers who have preceded them. These desultory remarks show that Positivists are not opposed to the extension of the scientific domain, and that they are not, as some are anxious to make the world believe, bound to accept every view put forth in the fundamental works of their founder. He himself asserted, and every commentator whose words have been accepted by Positivists have in turn asserted, that all his views were "relative," and therefore subject to revision and to rejection if found not to be well founded philosophically or for the good of the race morally.

Querist. By what means do you Positivists expect to bring about the changes in society which you deem desirable?

Positivist. We reject all force in dealing with social problems. We do not believe in war or in governmental interference to bring about any reform destined to be of lasting benefit to the community. We object to the soldier and the policeman. We believe in using moral agencies, and deem that no scheme of reform is of any value which is not based upon the changed convictions of the community. Hence, what we aim at is a change in the opinions of the people, and this can not be effected by bayonets or clubs, or by arbitrary laws in advance of the times. Agitation, to be productive, must be moral.

Querist. But surely some measures must be taken to bring about this change, which you so much desire, in public sentiment?

Positivist. Yes. We rely primarily upon education. Long and tedious years must necessarily elapse before any great change in public opinion can be effected; but our system will not have, can not have, fair play until our ideal of education is fully carried out. Indeed, all the problems of the day are secondary—subordinate—to this great one of the right education of the whole community. The labor question,—the woman question,—the governmental question,—all must wait for their final solution until the minds of the great mass of the community are scientifically trained. We hold that every individual born into the world should be given the very best education that it is in the power of society to bestow. There must be no exceptions to this rule. Ignorance must be absolutely banished, to secure the highest good of the community. The child of the scavenger is as much entitled to a fair start in the race of life, with the full command of all his physical and mental faculties, as is the offspring of the millionaire,—nor do we admit of any distinction of sex. We say that the girl, as well as the boy, should have all the advantages of education; and

we are wholly opposed to all public or private money appropriations for the training of special classes at the expense of the rest of the community. There is no justification for giving the exceptionally clever any additional advantages over the rest of the community. The prizes we are now holding out to those already blessed with a more perfect organization and fortunate condition than their fellows is singularly unfair. The Democratic conception of education is the true one, that of the absolute equal right of every child born to the best education the state or community can afford.

Querist. Do you then advocate governmental interference in education?

Positivist. No. Theoretically we are opposed to all state education, yet, as we incline to be practical in all things, we can not overlook the fact that education is more advanced in those communities where the state insists upon imparting the rudiments of knowledge to its children than among those nations where the state neglects all aid to educational enterprise. It is enough to compare Germany with the rest of Europe, to show the immense advantage of a wise governmental education of the people above the pernicious neglect of all education. Still, the ideal education — that which we advocate—is where it is administered to all, not by state officials and for governmental purposes, but by the scientific body. Under our *régime* the education of the child would be divided between the mother and the scientist or priest. There would be no juvenile—or so-called Primary—schools in a Positivist community. The mother would have the charge of her children until they were fourteen years of age, when the girl or lad would be handed over to the care of the scientific instructor. Nor would education mean with us the so-called "three R's"—"readin', 'ritin', and 'rithmetic;" but in early life it would be mainly

artistic, and tending to the chastening of the emotions and ennobling of the ideas. This conception is, however, impossible of realization so long as the mothers of the race remain so grossly ignorant, as even the best educated of them now are.

Querist. Are not the many colleges and universities in the land rapidly correcting that evil in this country at least?

Positivist. While we regard the formation of male and female universities as probably inevitable for some time to come, we deplore their existence, and hope the time will come when there will be no need of them; for the education which is now imparted to the few, would, under our administration, be freely given to all. At present, we are compelled to look upon them as a necessity, a mere preparatory step toward the realization of a more perfect future.

Querist. What relation, under the Positivist *régime*, would religion bear to education?

Positivist. We insist upon religion as the most important part of the educational scheme, but we would confine our religious teaching to the inculcation and enforcement upon the child of the virtues which all religions recognize and honor, and at the same time keep clear of all sectarian bias or superstition of creed. The child would be taught truthfulness, courtesy, honor,—its emotional fervor would be trained under proper restraints, its artistic instincts given free play. In short, we would aim to make the child a noble human being, with all its better nature developed along with all its mental capacities. This, we say, would be true religious teaching. The dogmas and the creeds are all so much mere rubbish. When the question of religions *versus* secular education again comes to the surface, it will be the aim of the Positivists to reconcile the theologians to the secularists by this compromise, that

the virtues which a true religious culture should inculcate shall be given to the children,—to which the secularists could not very well object, while at the same time the dry husks of creed would not be pressed upon the child in its school. Nothing can be more dreadful than the conception of education prevailing in our public schools, the mere teaching of letters, arithmetic, and grammar to the child. What makes the child a noble man or woman? It is not the little information you pump into it, but the graces, courtesies, artistic instincts, and the restraints of appetite which it is taught in early life. These, only, are of value in education to fit the child for the highest and worthiest human uses. Here I would remark, that in the growing conception of the social uses of wealth, it is first recognized in the direction of education, and hence our rich men who feel the divinely human impulse to bestow or rather to give back their wealth to the community, do so in the form of educational trusts in a majority of instances. Very many of these bequests are wasted in inculcating the discredited and illusory theology of the day, but the impulse of the givers is, nevertheless, a noble one. Mr. Peter Cooper has fully recognized the Positivist ideal of education in devoting his wealth to the training of the young in science and art, a course of conduct which does him infinite honor. The Vassar College, the Simmons' bequest; the Sheffield School at Yale,—all these show in what direction tends the current of thought among the rich men who feel this new inspiration of humanity. It is the artistic and scientific training of the young which is, in reality the first great step toward the regeneration of modern society.

CONVERSATION THIRTEENTH.

Querist. How do you regard domestic service? Is there any necessary degradation in it? and can the work of the world be carried on without a class set apart to do the hard and often repulsive labor of the household?

Positivist. Our religion sanctifies all labor done for Humanity or any of her individual organs. Christianity not being a secular religion as Positivism is, it signally fails in dealing with questions like this of domestic service. The servant is theoretically held to have an immortal soul, liable to suffer eternal torments, yet the whole domestic polity of Christian households is calculated to prepare the "help" for the hell the "master" professes to believe in. All the repulsive work must be done by the servants; they are not allowed companionship; their hours of toil are excessive; culture is denied them; they are in the home, but not of it. The Christian myth of the curse on labor degrades workers of all kinds, but more especially the domestics. The slang terms applied to them, "potwolloppers," "slewers," "kitchen wenches," and the like, tell the story of their degradation in the popular estimation. Now, Positivism honors all labor if its object is to carry on the work of the race, or in any way serve Humanity. It is the idler, the do-nothing, the loafer whom we hold in contempt. The motto of the Prince of Wales, "Ich Dien" (I serve), is a noble one. The servant with us is a necessary and honored member of the family. He or she does not work for us for wages, but for love of the service and of us. Our obligation is not closed with the payment of the compensation agreed upon; we owe, in addition, to those who have served us faithfully, consideration, care, kindness, and love. Why is it the American girl instinct-

ively avoids household service? Only because of the popular disesteem in which it is held. They are not to be blamed; the difficulty is in a public opinion based upon the current Christian belief in the curse on labor. The liberal school, so-called, can apply no corrective, for it has no polity to adjust human relations any more than its orthodox opponent; but Positivism, with its noble human ideals, its scientific morality, its devotion to Humanity, and its care of the personal needs of the race, is the only system which has a real solution of the question of domestic service. Queens and kings in times past had nobles for their ladies and gentlemen of the bedchamber. Let us reverse the process, and make our body-servants nobles, by recognizing the fact that it is worthier to serve than to be served, to confer obligations than to accept them.

Querist. A word about government. You seem to resent governmental interference, and yet, if I understand you, you believe in authority, in certain persons having control over the rest of the community? Please explain?

Positivist. We believe in a government *of* the people, and *for* the people, but not *by* the people. We believe that authority must be lodged in individual organisms; hence, that some one must have the general care of the community, and that that some one can no more be elected by a majority vote than can the general of an army be elected by the privates, or the pilot by the passengers of a vessel. Those who wield authority must be selected, and not elected. One of our co-religionists, during the excitement of the Paris Commune, issued a book in which appeared, as the motto at the head of one of the chapters, a sentence to this effect, "We must have a new Atheism to get rid of the god Majority." Now, what he meant, and what we all mean, is that government by counting noses is to us a preposterous government. It may be inevitable at a certain stage of human progress, but we in-

sist that the government of the future will be that of selection instead of that of election. We already see evidences of this in the demand in this country for the filling of offices by competitive examination and for life. The civil service reform, so-called, is the entering wedge for a new system of government, or rather one which has obtained in China for thousands of years. It is a curious circumstance that our modern discussions regarding government, finance, banking, etc., are simply reproductions of what the Chinese went through probably five or six thousand years ago. Even the whole paper money question was settled by the Chinese, as far as it could be settled, when our forefathers were savages drinking wine or mead out of the skulls of their enemies. This demand, all over the civilized world, for a civil service reform, for the appointment of minor officials after a competitive examination as to their qualifications, is simply a repetition of what was true of China many thousand years ago. The backward state of knowledge in that remarkable country of course has interfered with the development of the full value of this system of government, for that is what it really amounts to. After we have secured competency and efficiency in the minor offices, in the Custom House and the Post Office, and in the clerical departments, it will be regarded as intolerable that we should be ruled by the ignorant and corrupt babblers who now form the great majority of our legislative bodies. We are beginning to make education, character, and efficiency tests for all the clerical appointments under our government, and these same tests must, in time, be applied to all the higher departments as well. Most of the people have no comprehension of the far-reaching consequences of this agitation for civil service reform. It is not confined to this country alone. We are far behind the English, as they are behind the Germans and the French, in the application of this con-

ception of the business of government. This is the first step toward the Positivist conception of government. We do not believe in universal suffrage. We insist that leaders must be selected for their fitness, and that while the popular voice may sometimes be quite correct in calling for a certain chief, he as often must be self-elected, and still more often chosen by somebody who acts in the interests of the people, but who does not represent their passions and prejudices.

Querist. How do you regard the late Paris Commune? Have you any sympathy with its aims or methods?

Positivist. A very great deal of sympathy with its aims,—for its methods, nothing but condemnation. We do not believe in insurrection,—in the application of force to accomplish peaceful ends. The aim of the Parisian Communists was noble. It was foreseen by Auguste Comte. He predicted that the time would come when France would be ruled by a committee of workingmen. He inferred that the Column Vendome,—that insult to all Europe,—would be torn down and the ashes of Bonaparte removed from France. He also foretold that in time France would be divided into seventeen confederated republics. A very marked point in his philosophical prophecies can be quoted, in which he plainly stated that the anarchy of our times would yet bring about serious conflicts between the cities and the rural districts. All this has come to pass in our own time. Had Jeremiah or Habbakuk, or any of the old Jewish prophets, come within a hundred miles of as near to the truth in their predictions as Auguste Comte has done in this generation, the religious press of the day would be filled with arguments to prove the divine character of their utterances. The methods of the Communists were a natural outgrowth of the disorganizing theories so current in our time. They rejected all authority, and there is nothing more marked

in the destructive movement of modern times than the aversion felt for any human leadership. The first French Revolution had leaders. This last one had, practically, no centers of power. They changed even their generals day after day,—their civil officers still oftener. From such a body, so devoid of order or organization, no intelligent action is possible. Indeed, all faith in individuals seems to have died out of modern life. There is no body of men which commands unhesitating respect and confidence, without it be the scientific. What it utters is all that is respected. Upon the scientists devolves the duty, therefore, of the reorganization of society. The triumph of the Commune would have been disorganization,—chaos come again. We must have, in a good government, respect for human authority,—we must have leaders. We can not succeed in changing the face of society without our chiefs. In so far as the Commune attempted to free France from the curse of excessive centralization, to give a new life to the cities so that they would not be borne down by the ignorant rural voters, and so far as it brought the social question to the front, it had the sympathy of all Positivists. Its rejection of authority, its taking of arms, its warlike procedures, are all adverse to the spirit of true progress, and we do not care to commend them; but the spirit which animated the pulling down of the Column Vendome meets our heartiest approbation. The Commune, in itself, was a part of the so-called "Socialistic Co-operative Movement" which Positivism entirely rejects.

Querist. How about disease? Has Positivism a cure for the individual person as well as for the body politic?

Positivist. John Stuart Mill criticised Comte sharply for declaring that disease was a departure from Unity, but that conception has now become a commonplace among medical experts. Disease is not an entity. There are no specifics. Therapeutics is not a science. Health is a state

in which all the functions of the body act normally. It is the perfect relation between the organism and its environment. Disease is when the human body is put out of this proper relation to its surroundings. It is a departure from Unity, in other words. This is already confessed to be the case by the most eminent physicians. Medical science has made extraordinary progress in the understanding of disease. The knowledge of morbid conditions acquired by modern investigators is truly wonderful,—but, at the same time, the science of cure (so-called, for there is no reality in so saying) has stood still. We are no nearer a knowledge of absolutely correct and unfailing methods in the case of disease than were the Greeks in the time of Hippokrates. Improved sanitary conditions, personal and public hygiene, are subjects in which we have made real progress. We have simply to conform, as far as possible, to the conditions of life, to avoid disease; but we may as well recognize, first as last, that there is no certain virtue in medicine. Doctors are generally pretenders, and the first step toward a comfortable life is in getting rid of that old fetish of curative medical science. Nobody is cured; *restored* is the right word to mark the change from illness to health. One may conform to the laws of life and health and shun disease, in great measure at least; but even that is not possible to the individual alone. He must be aided by the co-operation of the community, by a well-organized form of government for the public good. A man can not, for instance, save himself from being a drunkard without he has the help of society in protecting him against the tyranny of his appetites, by aiding him in controlling his passions and tastes.

Querist. Are there any indications of the spread of Positivism outside the school with which you act?

Positivist. The air is full of it. It crops out in the most unexpected quarters. We see it in the scientific move-

ments of the age—in the educational tendencies of the times—in the applications of art to use instead of ornament—in the growing conception of the valuelessness of everything which does not tend to help Humanity—in the dying out of the old faiths—in the education of legislators and public opinion with respect to questions of hygiene and other regulations for the public good; especially in the literature of the day are exhibited marked Positivist tendencies. In past times the historians told us of the deeds of the gods, and poets celebrated the victories of the god-men; later, history was devoted to recording the deeds of men in past times. Recent history has done a great deal toward rehabilitating the characters of men whom former historians had described as infamous; but it was a great step forward when history dealt with the affairs of men instead of the doings of fetishes and lesser gods,—when it became secular instead of theological. The most hopeful tendencies observable in the present time are the books which treat of the future. It is very remarkable that in the last few years a literature has sprung up anticipating the future. "The Battle of Dorking," "The Coming Race," the articles in our magazines and newspapers touching the coming man and woman, are all evidences that the higher order of literary men are beginning to understand that society is not ruled by an absolute will or an infinite caprice, but that there are certain tendencies in humanity, certain controlling laws which can be traced out and by which we can anticipate the future. The test of all science is prevision,—the certainty of a true sociology is when we can foretell what is to take place hereafter. Writers are beginning to do it now, partly as if it were a joke, but it will not be many years before they will do it in real earnest. A wise Human Providence will enable us to anticipate our needs, and to provide fully for the wants and contingencies of the future.

Querist. Has Positivism any international polity? has it any rule between nations, any way of lifting up savage races?

Positivist. Our theory recognizes the relativity of all human institutions. We hold that any current belief or faith must have some relation to existing human needs. Hence we say that the Fetichist has a religion suited to his wants, and that all efforts to rid the savage of his native beliefs, and impose upon him the intellectual or religious convictions of the higher races, are unphilosophical, unnatural, and can not but prove in the end pernicious. The Positivist, therefore, discountenances the missionary efforts of the Catholic and Protestant churches. When we organize missions we will recognize the validity of the faiths of these inferior races, and will not try to naturalize the conceptions of an advanced civilization among savage or semi-civilized peoples. Nothing but mischief has resulted from this attempt to impose faiths alien to them upon these backward nations. What naturally shocks the savage or semi-civilized tribe or nation is the want of any human morality on the part of their Christian conquerors. So far, the conduct of the civilized nations toward the barbarous has been simply inhuman. Force has been used to extend commerce, and the vices of the civilized nations have helped to destroy the population and embitter the lives of the inferior races which have passed under the rule of European governments. Positivist morality sternly condemns the crimes of Christendom. It insists that the Christianity which has no human polity, which has never raised its voice against the crimes committed by the civilized world upon these poor savages, has no right to attempt to convert them to a series of intellectual conceptions for which they they are unfitted, and which do them no good in this world. You perceive from this that in everything Positivism rejects all concep-

tions of the absolute; there is no absolute right or absolute wrong; everything is relative to humanity. The man at the antipodes has a different notion of up and down from what I have; my up is his down, and *vice versa.* The observer stationed half way between us sees an horizon where I see a zenith. We are all relatively right; but were the man at the antipodes to say that his up was an absolute up, and his down an absolute down, he would make the same mistake that the Christian minister makes in trying to impose his conceptions of right and wrong upon a people who reverse them naturally. While Positivism preaches the very highest form of monogamy ever propounded, it recognizes that in the march toward civilization polyandry and polygamy are necessary steps in social progress, and would do no violence to institutions sanctioned by time and custom. Our motto of "Live for others" is of universal application; and when generally recognized, not only will it teach a higher individual morality than any yet known, but it will entirely reconstruct the relations of nations by teaching them, not first to consider their own wants, but the needs of those with whom they come in contact. When this is done, there will be no more wars, nor those scandals of our civilization, conflicts to force opium upon an unwilling people, or to drive trade into communities where it only produces disturbances and misery. All these things will be rectified when a scientific morality replaces the imperfect theological and metaphysical morals which now obtain credence among men.

Querist. What is the present position of Positivism throughout the world? What prospect is there of a recognition of the religion of Humanity?

Positivist. On this subject we have no illusions. It will be many years before Positivism, as a religion, receives its due recognition; we see it, however, asserting

itself in unexpected quarters; it is spontaneous in our modern civilization. As yet, the numbers who adhere to what may be called the extreme statement of the faith, are very few; I doubt if there are two hundred persons in the whole world who could honestly say they accepted all of Comte's teachings on this subject; but outside of that two hundred are tens of thousands who are, to a greater or less extent, adherents, and outside of those thousands are hundreds of thousands who accept the philosophy while rejecting the religion, because not yet understanding it. In our view, those who accept the Positive Philosophy, or who take any part whatever in the scientific movement of the age, are upon the road to complete Positivism; it is simply a question of time. The head of our church is M. Pierre Lafitte, in Paris; he is a poor man and lives by his labor. Dr. Robinet, the biographer of Auguste Comte, is another noted Positivist in Paris; this gentleman also lives in lodgings and voluntarily keeps himself poor; he is a physician of note, but will take no fee from the poor and charges only sixty cents a visit to the rich; he devotes himself to Humanity, and will have his reward. Our head in England is Dr. Richard Congreve, now, I grieve to say, in ill-health. He is a graduate of Oxford, was a tutor in that institution, and is the author of many works on Positivism. Professor Beesly, of the London University, is another well-known Positivist, as is also Dr. J. H. Bridges, of Sheffield, who is the translator of several of Comte's works. Mr. Frederic Harrison is well known as one of our most prominent leaders in England. These gentlemen are all voluntarily poor. Mr. Harrison, who is a lawyer of good standing, lost two of the best years of his life in sitting upon a Parliamentary Commission to inquire into the working of Trades Unions in England, and has the credit of having been able to change the Commission from its avowed object of producing testimony to crush out the

trades unions into a statement whereby they have become legalized institutions of Great Britain. Workingmen of a future generation will canonize Frederic Harrison for what he has done for the laboring class of England. Dr. Bridges is a physician, but declines to accept fees for his services. Professor Beesly also works gratuitously. Positivism, however, has its adherents all over the globe. We ask of those who accept the faith only the payment of a small fee regularly, which forms part of a sacerdotal fund, and is transmitted to Paris.

CONVERSATION FOURTEENTH.

Querist. As it appears that we have now come pretty nearly to the end of our conversation, are you satisfied that you have given as full and clear a statement of the views of the Positivists as the public would have a right to expect?

Positivist. No; not by any means. Far from being comprehended within the limits of a small book, the substance of Positivism, in its effective and rightful illustration, would require at least a hundred volumes, since it involves all science, history, philosophy, and religion. Every domain of human thought and activity comes under the sway of Positivism. Hence, such conversations as we have had are merely intended to meet the case of those who, having heard of Positivism, are anxious to obtain some further knowledge of the leading features of the system. We hope that from the views here presented they may be induced to pursue the study still further. Satisfied as we are of the excellence of the Positivist philosophy, in its application to all the concerns either of society

or the individual, we can only hope that the views now set forth, inadequate though they may be, will act as a stimulus to curiosity, and induce the public to become better acquainted with it.

Querist. You have nothing, then, corresponding to the Apostles' Creed,—no brief abstract or statement of Positivism that would enable the inquirer to seize at a glance the salient points of the Positivist philosophy and religion?

Positivist. No. As yet no one has attempted to make any such brief condensation of our views. We must be careful not to mislead; hence any statement of that kind would probably oblige us to set forth what we *do not*, as well as what we *do*, believe. Besides, these concise statements sometimes obtain very different interpretations from different orders of minds, as the raging controversies with which ecclesiastical annals are bestrewn abundantly prove. Such a statement in our case might lead to grave misapprehension, and excite annoying prejudice. For instance, if we were to declare that we do not believe in a personal God, or in Immortality, we should certainly create a false impression in regard to the tendency of the Positivist religion. We do believe in a Supreme Being,—as we say, the *only* Supreme Being. We do believe in an Immortality. And yet we can understand that our explanation of these tenets would, to some people, seem like non-belief in either. Let me try in a few words to state the leading principles of the Religion and Polity of Positivism. First, then, we believe in Humanity as the only Supreme Being that man can possibly know. We believe that there is a real Immortality for man, both objective and subjective; but no conscious life hereafter, so far as our faculties go. We believe that all service, love, and worship should be paid to this Supreme Being discovered, as we say, by science. This involves the worship of human excellence as embodied in human forms. The man ought to worship

the woman as mother, wife, and daughter. The woman ought to worship the man as the true human Providence. This devotion of all our energies and activities to the exaltation of Humanity gives a new standpoint for the treatment of the Woman question and the Labor question. We teach the moralization of Wealth,—in other words, that all the products of past and present labor should be devoted to Humanity, and not to individual luxury or aggrandizement. This moral conception will, we believe, effect more for the benefit of the human race than all the socialistic or Communistic theories which are so rife in our time; herein, we believe, is the true solution of all those difficulties which beset the relations of Capital and Labor. While exalting Woman, and worshiping her as the type of all that is sweetest and purest and noblest in Humanity, we say that she must give way to man in all the practical details of life; that men are the workers and the providers, and that they must take care of the women, not permitting them to work, but giving them charge of the esthetic, domestic, and moral concerns of the race. Positivism does not recognize the rights of women at all,—nor, in fact, the rights of men either. The only right a human being can have is the right to do his or her duty. We substitute duty in every case for right. Instead of self-assertion we prescribe self-abnegation. That is an idea of morality which has been recognized in all ages; and the researches of modern physicists prove the conception to be truly scientific.

Querist. What works would it be well to consult in order to learn further particulars of Positivism?

Positivist. The fact that Positivism involves the whole scientific movement of the age, will convince you that it is extremely difficult to recommend any work, or indeed any one class of works, as embodying the principles of Positivism. The writings of John Stuart Mill, however,

as well as those of G. H. Lewes, Professors Huxley and Tyndall, Charles Darwin, Professors Tylor and Haeckel, and the works of Herbert Spencer, are all more or less imbued with the spirit of Positivism, and are exponents of the Positivist religion and philosophy. These writers are not all of them avowed Positivists; but they teach the thing, though they deny the name. For information in regard to the works of Auguste Comte there is the translation by Harriet Martineau of the "Course of Positive Philosophy." There is also a translation by Dr. J. H. Bridges of the first volume of the *Politique Positive*, entitled a "General View of Positivism." There is also an English translation of the "Catechism of the Religion of Humanity," done by Dr. Richard Congreve. Other works on the same subject will be announced in the catalogue of the firm that publishes this little work.

APPENDIX.

A.

POSITIVISM.

The following address was delivered before the New York Liberal Club, the 5th Shakespeare 83 (14th September, 1871), by Henry Evans, Secretary of the New York Positivist Society:

Ladies and Gentlemen—I am told to speak to you on Positivism, and to do it in ten minutes! The only outline of Positivism extant fills a dozen volumes; to take them all at once condensed even as far as possible would be like going "across the continent" by lightning; no amount of holding breath or shutting eyes would render it safe for you or me.

I will venture a few words about the purpose, scope, and need of this new "*ism*," hoping to seriously turn your attention to it.

The first thing that strikes you on looking at it is, that it is an entire change of base. The old cargoes of Theology and Metaphysics must be thrown overboard, and the decks thoroughly washed.

There is no use studying Positivism with a head full of Gods, Spirits, Spiritualism, Entities, Principles, Types, Nature and her works, designs, purposes, ends, intuitions, longings, and the thousand-and-one heaps of rubbish that are drifting into unhinged heads from the disintegration of the Gods and Theologies. The first thing, in other words, is to empty your pitcher before you present it again to be filled at the fountain of Truth. Most of the students of Positivism fail from this cause alone. It can not be held half and half. Why not? Because it is an integral doctrine, a complete synthesis, and therefore a complete solution of the World, of Man, his Duty and Destiny. This, in short, is its purpose. There is no room for another "ism," and it can not be got into a head until other "isms" and "ologies" are out, or getting out. Positivism is always accepted just in proportion as it is understood.

Now, as to its scope, it is the grandest picture ever laid before the eye or mind of man. To think—to act—to feel. These are the grand divisions of man considered individually or collectively, as one man, or the Race. Out of feeling comes thinking,—out of thinking comes acting, and we act to effect the objects for which we feel. We must have, then, a worship or culture of the emotions in order to nourish and sustain noble and useful thoughts to the attainment of noble and useful ends of life. The Positive Philosophy is a philosophy "with a purpose." That purpose is the highest good of the race as a whole, and not of any one man, not even the very important man who may be studying it. But is not this an objection? What business has the philosopher with a purpose?

Is not his sole object Truth, the whole Truth, and nothing but the Truth, wheresoever it leads? Yes; but "what is Truth?" The whole Truth, can man know it all? The truth that man can know is only the knowledge of the relations that things bear to himself, and he to them. It is all relative to man. As the man *is*, so will his truth be. His inquiries always have a motive, *an emotion*, that prompts and sustains them, and this determines what he learns, discovers, and invents. Truth is thus: 1st. As to its origin, it is the acquired and inherited perceptions of mankind. This is its intellectual limit. 2d. It is relative to mankind, and limited by human experience. 3d. It is to be sought for only for the good of mankind. This is its moral object and limit.

These three results follow from the thorough acceptance of the "relativity of human knowledge," which our philosophers pretend to accept, but always seek to evade. All who do accept it and all its consequences are Positivists. They rest upon Man and the World as we know it, or can know it.

The Theologians rest upon an objective God.

The Metaphysicians rest upon some nature, or type, or entity, or Ideal conception outside of man.

The Spiritualists rest upon an assumed spirit outside of man.

The Materialists rest upon a substance outside of man, as a reality.

The Spencerians rest upon an order of the world outside of man.

The Positivists see that one and all of these outside supports are only so many sins against "relativity," and not truths at all, nor in any way provable. They are merely like Space and Time, Force and Motion, modes of consciousness of Man. Man is the only reality. These outside supports are false as bases of Philosophy.

But this is not the worst. They are sins against the moral object and limit of Philosophy. By placing the object of support outside of mankind and its welfare, Man becomes the secondary object, and plays second fiddle to the God, or thing, or conception upon which he is dependent. Thus he is always the weaker half of a hopeless dualism. He never can become complete or whole upon any of these theories. He is divided in mind, purpose, and hope. Anarchy is his portion without possible escape except to the Positive Philosophy and Religion.

I say Religion,—for Positivism is a complete logic of the whole of Human Nature, and binds together the thoughts and activities of Man and directs them to Unity by a logic of the Sentiments. A religion that is a logic of the Sentiments is the sun and crowning glory of Positivism. Out of the heart are the issues of life, of thought and action, and how, and for what, to keep and feed the heart, is the problem of all religions and worships. Positivism solves this problem by discovering the true obligations that are binding on man. It is thus a religion pure and simple—the Universal Faith, of which all others were but provisional precursors. This is the greatest scientific discovery ever made. Yet our opponents—many of them men of great learning and ability—can not see it. They talk about Comte as having "devised" Humanity as

God,—as though he might just as well have taken a cat or a dog or a monkey. He "devised" God just as Newton devised gravitation, or a naturalist devises a new species of plants or animals; that is, he discovered that Humanity was the grand organism of life, in which all men and even all domestic animals converge, and which they serve as organs whether they will or no. This grand organism sums up all knowledge, thought, feeling, and activity—all existence. In and by it "we live and move and have our being," and as parts of it we think, feel, and act, and not otherwise. To love and serve it is our highest duty; we must therefore "act from affection, and think in order to act." This keeps the heart pure, and the mind exalted.

This Organism, this Humanity, is the only true SUPREME BEING —scientifically so discovered and known, whether we will or no. If we as its organs get ourselves in harmony with its laws and its progress through the ages, it will be well with us, and its grand course will be smooth and the millennium will not be a myth. If we fail to do this, misery to us and the generation is the result. It will by the laws of its existence go crushing on. The logic of Religion, of Human Sentiments, is to see scientifically this order, and order our lives accordingly. How to do this, Positivism teaches and inspires us. Is not this the main thing of life? Is it not needed? Is there unity of thought, feeling, and action elsewhere? Can there be any other theory? I see no pretense of anything of the kind. I see confusion, misery, degeneration, all the result of the Babel of tongues and thoughts springing from hearts divided and running wild in anarchy.

Hail! then, to Positivism the Religion of Science, the Universal, the Human Faith that brings unity and relief to man. How else can his misery end? The Fetichists are still a majority on the planet, so the provisional stages of theology and metaphysics will remain and be useful for those who can rise no higher. But men of science and advancement must unite upon the Scientific Religion, and then, though but a handful, their knowledge and good will be power—the power of God, and the kingdom of the world and man will be theirs; and under their guidance LOVE will erect a throne on the ruins of ignorance, superstition, and fear; the arts of Peace will flourish, and joyous nations will embrace each other in the bonds of eternal brotherhood.

B.

POSITIVISM AND COTEMPORARY IMMORALITY.

THE following paper was read before the New York Positivist Society, Sunday, October 8th, 1871, by JOHN ELDERKIN:

Morality and religion, although closely associated, are independent in origin and distinct in character. By their interaction, the most important results in the progress of the race have been

achieved. Religion, which had its origin in superstitious fear and wonder, engendered by phenomena inexplicable to man in a state of barbarism, by gaining control over the minds of large bodies of men, identified them with each other, and thus became the great organizer in history. The association of religion with morality was strictly logical. Morality had to do with conduct, with our relations to each other and natural phenomena. It is the term applied to the right ordering of conduct. When man in his ignorance personified the forces of nature and endowed them with human volition, he created monsters of intelligence and will which it was of the first importance to him to propitiate. Hence such an ordering of conduct as seemed most in accordance with this purpose became in his eyes right, and therefore moral. Religion in this way gained empire over conduct. But religion having its origin in the relation of man to the external world, and having for its end the conciliation of deities which were no other than the common natural agencies of earth and sea personified or endowed with human wills, constantly tended to the prescription of rules of conduct calculated to bring man into harmony with his environment. Hence we find that the rules of conduct prescribed by nearly every religion, which has, as it were, come to maturity, harmonize very completely with the standard of morality dictated by the highest knowledge. Religion has thereby not only tended to the development of humanity by a better adaptation of man to his physical environment, but by associating him in vast bodies all alike under its dominion, it has developed those immediate personal relations between men themselves which constitute high moral character in the individual. The sense of responsibility for acts which, although of immediate personal advantage, are prejudicial to the interests of the community to which the individual belongs, must be credited to the influence of religion, since no scientific knowledge of the immoral influence of such acts has ever been generally disseminated; nor is it at all probable that if so disseminated it would have the power of restraining the selfish propensities and natural passions of the race. It is the consecration of life to the purposes of the whole body of co-religionists which religion has exacted which has developed that subtile moral sense which has restrained men from the commission of acts which, although of direct personal advantage, are of indirect disadvantage to all others. In view of these facts, when there shall be noticed in any large body of people a weakening of the moral bonds and a lowering of the moral standard, it may be more than suspected that such is in consequence of the decay of the religious sanctions of morality.

Throughout Europe and America the Judaic formula of religion has held sway for many centuries. The ingrafting of the ideas of Jesus upon this old stock enlarged its power of assimilation, and made its acceptance possible to all nations and races. But the mythological Jehovah of Judaism has been the primary deity of the modern world. This deity has been in form a magnified man with supernatural adjuncts. As mankind has progressed in these latter ages, this deity has gradually absorbed all characteristic human ex-

cellences, until the Christian God has become an epitome of the highest humanity.

In order to get at the peculiar influence of this Judaic religion we must consider the conception which the Jewish deity personified, which will be the sum and substance of our Bible religion. This Jewish conception may be expressed as "the power in the world which makes for righteousness." According to Matthew Arnold, by *The Eternal* the Jews meant the Eternal righteous. They had dwelt upon the thought of conduct and right and wrong, until the unexplainable became to them the power which makes for righteousness; which makes for it unchangeably and eternally, and is therefore called *The Eternal.* The word righteousness is the master word of the Old Testament; *cease to do evil, learn to do well*, these words being taken in their plainest sense of conduct; *offer the sacrifice*, not of victims and ceremonies, as the way of the world in religion then was, but, *offer the sacrifice of righteousness.* The great concern of the New Testament is likewise righteousness, but righteousness reached through particular means, righteousness by the power of Christ. *Let every one that nameth the name of Christ depart from iniquity*, is a summary of the New Testament, as is, *To him that ordereth his conversation right, shall be shown the salvation of God*, of the Old. This simple conception is the back-bone of the whole body of modern theology, in which it has been so completely embedded as to have been a good deal lost to sight. The worship of Jehovah has been devolved upon Christ and that impersonal entity, the Holy Ghost. Salvation has been made a matter of belief rather than of righteousness. Yet through all the metaphysical conceptions and doctrinal prescriptions of theologians there has run the thread of the law of right conduct; and hence the vast moral influence of Judaism upon the modern world. So far as morality now obtains, it is due to the loyalty to righteousness ingrained in the very web and woof of our human nature by the Judaic formula, whether it be denominated Catholicism, Puritanism, or Calvinism. But according to Mr. Froude, the power of Calvinism has waned; and not only Calvinism but Judaism, Catholicism, Christianity. Jehovah is relegated to mythology, and Christ has taken his place among the great men of history. The discipline of the faith which they inspired has fallen slack, and the mere shadow struggles to remain and preserve the power which inhered in the substance. There is an utter decay of theology. In the place of an active and aggressive faith in the old forms and doctrines, there is either positive hostility, passive unbelief, or partial acceptance. The sanctions of morality contained in the old religion are inoperative, save as inherited tendencies. In some instances the hostility to the doctrines of Christianity has passed to the system of morals which it inculcated, and we have skepticism allied with license. Throughout the whole Christian world we witness the gradual supplanting of religious aims by the selfish and unscrupulous pursuit of wealth and worldly honors. The great intellectual movement which has emancipated the modern mind from the doctrinal chimeras of the Middle Ages has tended to develop individual self-assertion, which

grasps with unhallowed hands whatever it requires for its own development. The most venerable institutions of society, such as marriage and the family, are assailed in the name of the individual. In the family, in trade, and in politics comes up one overpowering stench of sacrifices to the selfish desires of the individual. The selfishness which is at the root of our troubles is of the blackest and most unscrupulous type.

The evil forces are not confined in their action to men's single lives. They organize great assaults on the common life of society. They construct bad governments, generate pernicious customs, and take possession of the whole machinery of national and social life. The religious cry out: "The decay of theology is the decay of serious and earnest thinking, the gradual disappearance of faith, the loss of learning, the ignoring of the deeper questions of spiritual life." It is to be followed, if not withstood very soon, "by the loss of vision which ends in the obliteration of moral distinctions, and by general selfishness and worldliness." In their opinion, "Unless the interest in Christian theology is revived, Christianity will soon be in ruins, and the Gospel have to begin its work anew in a demoralized and atheistic world." This is the attitude of those who still hold to the old theology. It illustrates the despair which has seized upon all who seek a remedy in the old forms.

While deprecating the present melancholy condition of humanity, we can not, in the light of facts, but regard it as the inevitable accompaniment of a transition period. Until a new purpose of life in harmony with the present intellectual mastery of the physical world, and with the sense of the infinity which hedges us round about, shall be offered to men, we can not look for an end of the prevailing doubt and disquietude, or for the substitution of heroic and altruistic for selfish aims. The effort of orthodox Christians to divert the mind of the present generation to the old channels is like an effort to launch a great ship upon a mill stream. The old interpretation of nature and the assumptions of theology are altogether too shallow for the broad and deep intelligence of the modern mind. In more than one respect, however, this old theology was far wiser and stronger than the philosophy of utilitarianism, which would find in self-interest the new fountain of morality. *It* required a complete consecration of self to the highest conception of moral excellence; and although it held out the promise of future reward, it enjoined him who would be first in this world to be the servant of all. The old theology did not say, "You must do as nearly right as you can, for that is your best policy;" but, "He that findeth his life shall lose it; and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it." Nor yet do we perceive that in the deification of the unknowable of Herbert Spencer will there be provided anything beyond the philosophy of self-interest to justify and secure the consecration of human life. The unknowable can be conceived of as limiting human activity, and as a force of which we ourselves partake. The unknowable relates to what we are in essence, of which we can by no possibility know anything, since all our knowledge consists in a consciousness of differences or relations. The identi-

fication of the unknowable with Deity is a direct return to fetichism. There is no impulse to morality in the conception. When we acknowledge that beyond the relations of things we can not go, we have admitted that so far as our lives are ordered by our will, they must be ordered upon a knowledge and understanding of those relations as the base upon which human conduct and effort rest and act. But the impulse to a moral ordering of life, individual and social, must arise from a conviction of the converging power of Humanity as a grand whole, an organism of which each individual, however humble, is a necessary and important part. The laws of human progress reveal this Humanity, and the conviction gives an impulse to a moral ordering of life immensly more real and powerful than the authority of an assumed Deity or the attractions of a chimerical heaven. It is only to the more general realization of it that we can hope for an adequate moral impulse and order to sustain society as the old theology fails before the light of science.

This is the teaching of Positivism. Positivism does not overlook the unknowable, but regards it from every point of view that it presents itself to man. As all that we know or can know must come within the world of man, Positivism seizes upon man as a Kosmos. We know nothing but what has come to us through humanity. Bibles, history, science, inherited capacities come to us through human agencies. No more justice, good-will, or pity are at work in the world than men put in motion. "Men are impatient at the slowness of God. He is as slow as they are; His chariot goes just as fast as they drive. If good causes go on slow, it is because they give them no thought and make no effort to put them forward." The intelligence which looks before and after is man's intelligence, and there is nothing humiliating in tracing the course of its evolution from the lowest forms of life. If there is any sense or consciousness of infinity, it exists in man. From the unity of human intelligence and the absolute inter-dependence of men, Positivism arrives at its solemn asseveration of the duty of every man to consecrate his life to the good of the whole; an asseveration which science and self-interest alike pronounce also best adapted to promote the highest good of each individual. Positivism refers the obligations of duty as well as all sentiments of devotion to Humanity conceived as a continuous whole, including the past, the present, and the future. "Ascending into the unknown recesses of the past, embracing the manifold present, and descending into the indefinite and unforeseeable future, forming a collective Existence without assignable beginning or end, it appeals to that feeling of the Infinite which is deeply rooted in human nature," so says Mr. Mill; and another authority adds: "We may still further admit that all morality may be summed up in the disinterested service of the human race." The consecration of life to the service of Humanity completely fulfills the ideal of human usefulness. It is the outgrowth of all the tender and loving relationships of life. Man is bound up with his fellows in one grand organism as completely as any organ is bound up with the body. The nervous connections are not more numerous than are the relations, sentiments, and affections which

attach man to society and make social well-being incompatible with his ill-doing. He can not evade the responsibility of being either a blessing or a curse to Humanity. Our best men feel unconsciously the claim which Humanity has upon them, and dedicate their lives to philanthropic enterprise and public beneficence. In the general acceptance of the claims of Humanity, not only in the conduct of life, but as the embodiment of all that is grand and exalted in human thought, Positivists hope for the gradual amelioration and moralization of society.

C.

POSITIVIST DOCTRINE OF IMMORTALITY.

In a discourse preached at Lyric Hall, April 9th, 1871, Rev. O. B. Frothingham thus described the doctrine of Immortality as held by the "complete" Positivists. It is a fair statement of our view, and, on the whole, tolerably accurate:

A grander kind of immortality yet—grander, though less affecting—is that we have in Humanity. We live in Humanity; we are vitally connected with it as members. The human race is an organic being, that lives and grows from age to age, animated by one spirit, actuated by one power. "No one liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself." Standing midway between those that have gone before and those that are to follow after him, he receives and transmits the qualities that build up the social world. Existence is a process of receiving and giving. In us live the fathers; in the children we shall live forever—every atom of our nature being taken up, absorbed, worked over, as material for the coming man. As Lessing puts it: "The immortality of souls is indissolubly associated with the development of the race. We who live are not only the offspring of those who have lived before us, we are really of their substance; and it is thus that we are immortals, living forever."

This idea has, for thousands of years, been rooted in the world. Traces of it are found in the ancient religions. It was hinted at in the Egyptian doctrine of transmigration; it was conveyed in the Indian doctrine of absorption; the Chinese acknowledged it in their worship of ancestors. The ancient Hebrews, previous to the Captivity, seem to have known no other doctrine of immortality than this. The dying Hebrew was said to be "gathered to his fathers;" and, as he passed away, the thought last in his mind was of the posterity in whom he should continue to live. The Hebrew's prayer was for long life and for children and grandchildren—generations who should transmit his virtues and call him blessed. His kingdom of heaven was on earth; his dream of eternity was the glorious future of his race.

Gleams of the same belief shine through Pythagoras and Plato

and other sages of the old world. This is the belief of the Positivists of our own time. They cherish no hope of private immortality; that they describe as the fond anticipation of egotistical minds. They have much to say about living again in those that shall succeed them—about making a contribution to the happiness of their posterity—adding something to the capacity, skill, or virtue of the coming time—leaving behind works that may follow them; as they have entered into the labors of others, they would make it worth while for others to enter into theirs, consoled by the knowledge that no fragment of living bread will be wasted, that no accent of the Holy Ghost will be lost.

The great master of this school declares that for every true man there are two forms of existence: the one temporal and conscious, the other unconscious but eternal; the one involving the presence of a body which perishes, the other involving the action only of intellect and heart, which can not die—the latter alone worthy to be called that noble immortality of the soul after which the best aspire. To his female companion—who complains that such an immortality appalls her, by giving to her a sense of her insignificance that reduces her to nothing, and who begs to have revived in her a feeling of her own individual existence—the master replies, that the Great Being, Humanity, can not act except through individual agents; the collective life is but the result of the free concurrence of the efforts of simple individuals; all are nothing without each one, and each one, while embodied and conscious, may feel himself to be an indispensable part of the living whole; each is predestinated, and each is useful; each has a message, because each is sent. In the same strain another writer of great power: "Whatever happiness we derive from pure regard to our fellow-beings, and from satisfaction in the general welfare, will cling to us as long as we are capable of entertaining it; and whatever deeds we do, not 'in the flesh' for the gratification of self, but 'in the spirit,' for the love of God and mankind, we may know to be as immortal in their nature as God and mankind are immortal."

There is the conception—it must be confessed, a very impressive one to the calm, brave mind. For thirty years this gospel of immortality has been eloquently preached, not without effect. It has taken strong hold, not on the intellectual and passionless only, but on the working-people of intelligence in Europe, who have thrown off Christianity and discarded faith in a personal God. It is a belief that deserves consideration and respect from all who consider the claims of truth and from all who respect the serious convictions of earnest men. If it is not to be lightly accepted, it is not to be lightly ridiculed, for it contains the elements of great power.

The heartiest objection to it is, perhaps, its heartiest recommendation. *It effectually destroys egotism*, that taint in the common belief; it gives no encouragement to the selfish wish for a happiness purely personal; grants no indulgence to the longing for a heaven of idle rest or unearned recreation; rebukes the rash claim for private and unmerited rewards; says to men avaricious of crowns and thrones in the hereafter, what Jesus said to the ambi-

tious young men who asked for seats at the right hand and left hand of his throne: "What you ask is not mine to give." If pure disinterestedness be noble, then this doctrine has a character of supreme nobility; for it requires the renunciation of every interested or covetous passion; it bids men labor for what they shall never share, and fight for what they shall never enjoy. To any but the earnest, loving, and self-sacrificing it is cold and dreary; but to these it is inspiring and grand.

The doctrine is human, purely human—human in its very texture. It rests on the fact of human fellowship; it derives its vitality from the power of the sympathetic feelings: love—deep, unselfish, consecrating love, for human beings as such, for human beings unrelated, unknown, unborn—is its animating principle; the love of duty is its strength; the faithful ministry of mutual service is its living pledge and bond. It is nothing without others, many others, all others; its grandeur consists in the solemn perpetuity of that eternal Being called Man, whose existence rolls on through the ages, gathering might as it rolls, swelled by the great and little tributaries —the rivers and rivulets, the brooks and tiny brooklets, that add their rushing volumes or their trickling drops as it pours along.

The doctrine is spiritual. Rightly apprehended, it is the only purely spiritual doctrine that is entertained; for it puts out of sight altogether, and utterly abolishes, the consideration of "mine" and "thine." The spiritual faculty is the faculty of living in ideas, truths, laws; the spiritual glory is the glory that comes of so living; the spiritual being is the being who lives "not for himself alone," not for his private enjoyment or satisfaction or development, but for that which is a great deal more than himself, for that which is not phenomenal and passing, but stable and permanent, which will live when he is no more, the glory whereof he can increase and in a measure create, though in it he is absorbed. Lucifer forfeited his spirituality by setting up for himself. His brethren preserved theirs by their meek surrender to the perfect Will. As the spirituality of God consists, not in his being bodiless, but in his being self-renouncing—as a God who made the end of the universe to be his own glory would be precisely the reverse of spiritual—so is he the secker of a spiritual immortality who desires to live in others' future more than in his own.

The doctrine has its fine inspiration, too. The first aspect of it sends a chill to the heart. The ordinary man or woman feels annihilated by it. What is the ocean's debt to the drop of water? What is the sun's debt to a candle? What effect has a summer shower to sweeten the bitterness of an Atlantic or Pacific sea? How shall the planet feel the leverage of my little finger? What contribution is my faint breathing to the mighty blasts of truth and conscience that must blow the vessel of Humanity onward? This doctrine of immortality in the race may answer for a Buddha or a Moses, a Jesus or a Paul; it may satisfy a Pythagoras, a Sokrates, a Plato; the Augustines and Luthers, the Xaviers, St. Bernards, and Fenelons may rejoice in it; Dante and Milton, Shakespeare and Lessing, may press it to their bosoms; Mozart and Beethoven, Han

del and Mendelssohn, may wish nothing better; Leibnitz and Bacon, Newton and Galileo, may dwell on it with rapture; it may fill the dream of Raffaelle, Angelo, Da Vinci: for their great lives poured into the ocean of humanity as the waters of the Mississippi pour into the Gulf, as the waters of the Orinoco pour into the Atlantic, heaving up the level of the sea, and thrusting its purple current miles from the shore. They who are conscious of vast power can rejoice in great influence; but those who are conscious only of great weakness can promise themselves no such recognition, and must droop for lack of inducement.

If recognition were demanded, if an immortality of fame were the immortality coveted, this objection would be fatal, for the famous are the few. The mass are soon forgotten, living but a little while in the memory of their friends. But fame does not always follow influence. Many a great benefactor is scarcely remembered even by name. Many are quite unknown. The mass of mankind make Humanity, not the few; the multitude of the lowly and worthy decide what the future of society shall be. He who contributes a life of simple truth, sets an example of daily honesty, makes a happy home, trains his children well, is a loyal friend and a good citizen, practices the greatest duties in the smallest way,—does more to augment the sum of moral power in the world than any artist however admirable, any poet however sublime, or any genius however inventive. The doctrine of immortality in the race is peculiarly encouraging to the humble, earnest toilers, the unprivileged and ungifted; for their contributions are just what they choose to make them, and what they add is that which is most indispensable to the common good. We are not surprised, therefore, to learn that this doctrine is especially popular among the artisans, who know that all they can contribute is industry, patience, fidelity, intelligent skill, temperance, prudence, economy, but who know as none others do that these qualities are precisely what Humanity needs in its struggle for life. I have spoken at some length on this view of the immortal life because it is unfamiliar, and because it is misunderstood. I have spoken earnestly, because I could not speak at length; the words had to be vivid, because they had to be few.

D.

SOCIAL UTOPIAS AND FORECASTS.

The following remarkable article, which appeared as a review in the New York *World* of July 1st, 1871, is an evidence of the social value of Auguste Comte's labors. "Science," said he, "is prevision," and the proof that sociology is getting to be a science is shown by the fact that men are trying to forecast the future. Indeed, this has now become an important and growing department of literature. We are breeding a race of prophets, who will really

give us some notion of the future—that is, the real earthly future, not the chimerical heaven of the theologian:

Careful students of the characteristics and tendencies of the age, whatever be their philosophical opinions or theological predilections, can hardly fail to be impressed with the marked prominence of the human point of view in both. Examples are hardly necessary, but at random may be instanced: (1) the glorification of man and idealization of his work as witnessed in the drift of current theological thought and poetry; (2) the pursuits of the veriest fragments and shadows of knowledge upon his primitive state—the manners and customs, laws and economy, religion and philosophy of our barbarous progenitors near or remote; and (3) the formation of social utopias and forecasts more or less grounded on social and physical laws, which are supposed to picture either positively or negatively still higher ideals of life than any transmitted to us by the past.

The two former have been discussed in these columns on several recent occasions; the latter is our present theme.* Social utopias and forecasts are no new thing in the world. Since political amelioration has been an object of speculation and forethought, utopias of various kinds have from time to time appeared. The form which these products of the imagination take is dictated by the physical and social surroundings of the author, including under this head the attainments of his nation and of mankind at large in positive knowledge. Casting the eye over the past it is apparent that in theological ages, when the chimeras of the imagination, either beneficent or baneful, were actually realized to the reason, "forecasts" took the nature of revelations or prophecies from God vouchsafed to a divine messenger, to be by him delivered to his less favored countrymen, or those whom the Deity would preserve from the threatened evils. It is important to bear in mind in this connection—and this remark has general application—that in times of fancied security and luxurious ease these prophecies were always of disaster to be averted only by vigorous action. Such were the warnings of the mighty prophets of Israel and Judah, whose words even now, after the lapse of nearly thirty centuries, and under such changed conditions, almost make our ears still tingle with their weighty denunciations. On the other hand, the utopias then constructed always had more or less bearing upon a future life or a past

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* THE COMING RACE. William Blackwood & Sons: Edinburgh and London. 1871.

THE GERMAN CONQUEST OF ENGLAND IN 1875 AND THE BATTLE OF DORKING; OR, REMINISCENCES OF A VOLUNTEER. Philadelphia: Porter & Coates. 1871.

THE TRAVELS AND ADVENTURES OF A PHILOSOPHER IN THE FAMOUS EMPIRE OF HULEE IN THE YEAR A.D. 2071. *Fraser's Magazine* for June.

ANNO DOMINI 2071. Translated from the Dutch by Dr. A. V. W. BIKKERS. London: W. Tegg. 1871.

THE NEXT GENERATION. By JOHN FRANCIS MAGUIRE, M.P. 3 vols. London: Hurst & Blackett. 1871.

life of which nothing was known except what the god or gods chose to reveal. And here again a characteristic of these schemes should not be forgotten. It is that if forecasts are of danger when the sky is serene, utopias nearly always deal with security and peace in the midst of adversity and war.

Perhaps the use of the terms forecast and utopia with the foregoing significations and distinctions will be objected to as being arbitrary. To a certain extent it is so, and all use of such terms is more or less arbitrary. But there seems to be this real distinction between the two words: a forecast is a prediction founded upon a larger or smaller generalization of facts, while a utopia is an ideal construction out of materials either real or fictitious. With the eye firmly fixed upon some rottenness in the constitution of a state which has perhaps passed unperceived by the great majority of even acute observers, but which has proved in the past the ruin of other communities, some thinker boldly predicts disaster when every one else is applauding to the echo the general prosperity. This is a true social forecast—which is more often of adversity than of its opposite. But these forecasts might, on the contrary, predict the greatness of a people or their eminence in some branch of knowledge or art from certain earmarks which had been invariably found connected with them in other societies. Before passing on to illustrate the meaning of utopias, let us glance at a few instances of recent sociological predictions.

The existence of the Paris Commune has set very many heads to thinking and turning over the pages of books perhaps in many instances long unturned. In his eloquent article upon that government, and partial defense of its leaders and action, Mr. Frederic Harrison has called attention to some prophecies of Comte, which seem, to say the least, very remarkable pieces of social prevision. For instance, this philosopher appears to have predicted that workingmen would yet rule France; and certainly if the old adage that Paris was France had proved true, this would have been the case. This prophecy appears to have been made about 1848, but the prophet held to its substantial truth up to the day of his death, when the workingmen's chances were much smaller than they now are for achieving such distinction. He predicted also the continual failure of Parliamentary government in France; and Comte's followers aver that such is the case, and that the best minds of that country are even now turning away to something more solid than the deliberations of bribed assemblies of talkers for a real restoration of their country's prosperity. A bold work, published in 1864 by M. F. Le Play, entitled "La Reforme Sociale en France," which is very applicable to the present crisis, actually proposed, as Comte had done some forty years before, to terminate the revolutionary *régime*, and to substitute for the antagonist theories which date from 1789 "common opinions based upon the methodical observation of social facts." Another and perhaps more curious prevision of Comte was that in order for France and Paris to take their appropriate places in the march of civilization, it would become necessary to remove the ugly statue of Napoleon I. in the Place Ven-

dome, because it formed a standing menace and insult to the conquered nations whose humiliation was there immortalized. The Commune, as is well known, destroyed it; but that organization was too short-lived to carry out, even if it was willing, the supplementary parts of the programme: that the retrograde Emperor's dust should be transported back to St. Helena, whence it should never have been taken, and that a statue of the great Charlemagne, the true founder of the medieval European empire, should replace that of the Corsican butcher, "the child of infidelity and the reaction."

Passing from this instance, which may be looked upon as a happy guess, a coincidence, or a recommendation worked out, according to the individual temper of the reader, one of Comte's followers—M. Eugene Semerie—in a recent pamphlet with the rather striking motto, "Wanted, a new Atheism which will deny the god *Majority*," has cited a curious passage from the "Philosophie Positive," written in 1842, in which his master says that, though few have perceived the fact, still the air is full of the very worst kind of intestine broils and strifes, not only between classes, between laborers and employers, but even between the city and the country.* M. Semerie, writing in the midst of the Versaillist siege of Paris, of course pointed triumphantly to the then present state of affairs as proof of the wisdom and scientific foresight of his philosophical teacher Comte also predicted the division of France into seventeen republics—an idea which the Commune endeavored to work out with such poor materials. Despite Mazzini, it looks as if the cure of France lay in this reform, though how to carry it out practically is the desideratum.

Again, the union of the scientists and the workingmen was long ago recommended as necessary to the completeness of both, and foreseen as inevitable by this thinker. Curiously enough, the writer's attention has been called to a seemingly corroborative evidence that this is actually taking place, at least in England. A well-informed writer in the July *Galaxy* ("Republicanism in England") thus speaks of the London artisan:

> The London artisan of to-day has very different teachers from wild, gifted, crazy Fergus O'Connor. He has among his own class cool, sensible, practical men like Odger and Applegarth and Potter—men who never indulge in any bombast about the *proletaire* and the brotherhood of Humanity. He has leaders and teachers outside his own class in men like Professor Beesly and Frederic Harrison for example—men of culture and keen thought, fearless and often fantastic in their views, but always able to defend them by the closest logic and the most bewildering array of facts and figures. *I hold that one of the most remarkable phenomena of English political life to-day is this extraordinary and apparently instinctive fraternization between the "thinkers" and the workingmen.* On almost all public questions these seem to stand together. If, as I believe, the workingman of London was making a somewhat foolish exhibition last autumn, when he allowed his devotion to the republican principle to drown all sober consideration of the right and wrong of a controversy, if in fact he was making a *fetich* of the mere name of republic, it must be remembered that Beesly and Harrison and Ludlow, and the great majority of the school to which they belong, were doing just the same thing. On most political subjects now, if you want to know what the London workingman believes, you have only to inquire what Mill

* Vol. VI., 1st ed. (1842), p. 874; 2d and 3d eds., p. 755.

and Huxley and their less renowned companions and followers believe. Thus, therefore, did the political condition of England present itself to my mind when, after an absence of two years, I endeavored to study it impartially and coolly. I take it that the artisans of the towns are about to become an active and direct political power. The Reform bill of 1831–32 brought in middle-class wealth to compete with aristocratic rank. The Reform bill of 1868 has brought in artisan labor to share the competition. I have wholly mistaken the meaning of what I saw and heard, if the workingmen of the English cities have not quite made up their minds to the conviction that republican democracy is the best form of government. The English Church seems to have become almost wholly alienated from the sympathies of the workingman. One branch of it concerns itself about candles and screens and genuflexions; another about denouncing the Papists and the Lady of Babylon. *Between the two the workingman has been allowed plenty of time to learn that there are such persons as Mill and Huxley.* On the side of the workingman there is growing up that school I have already mentioned of keen, clever, bold, and penetrating political writers, whose tendency is undoubtedly toward republicanism, even if they do not preach republicanism as a creed—men who subject every existing institution of the English political system to a criticism as sharp and searching as if "the wisdom of our ancestors" really had no manner of sanctity about it all. Decidedly the age is a skeptical one in English politics, and the artisan of the cities is a very Thomas in his reluctance to believe in the reality of anything he has not had a chance of testing for himself. Loyalty of the old-fashioned kind he has wholly ceased to feel or to respect. He has just as much faith in the sanctity of the monarchical principle as he has in the power of the sovereign's touch to heal the scrofulous.

At the risk of wearying the reader's patience, it is perhaps worth mentioning that when socialism had the upper hand among reformers, and when the legacy of the Revolution was the further distribution and if possible equalization of wealth, Comte, himself a reformer, urged the individuality of property and responsibility, and predicted that great aggregations of wealth, instead of becoming rarer, would become more common. And certainly it does look as if such was the tendency of the times.

About thirty years ago Heinrich Heine, upon whom, according to Mr. Matthew Arnold, fell the mantle of Goethe, wrote to his native country a series of letters dated at Paris. His predictions of the coming of the Commune are certainly wonderful, and show how closely, foreigner as he was, he had studied French society. After ridiculing in the keenest vein the correspondents who write to their journals about court fêtes, dinner parties, and dress, taking as an instance the fact that such historians as they passed by for centuries the early Christian church to whom the future belonged, he says (the *Spectator*, June 10):

It is by no means my intention here to relapse into homiletical considerations; I only wish to show by an example in what a triumphant manner the distant future might justify the predictions with which I have often spoken of a little congregation that, very like the *Ecclesia pressa* of the first century, is at present despised and persecuted, but which is spreading a propaganda with a warmth of faith and a sinister spirit of destruction that also recall the Galilean beginnings. I mean the Commune, the only party in France worthy of earnest attention. The confession, that the future belongs to the Commune, I make in a tone of foreboding and of the greatest anxiety, which is not, alas! by any means a mask. Truly, only with fear and trembling can I think of the time when these dark picture-stormers shall attain empire; with their horny hands they will break up those marble statues of beauty so dear to my heart; they will shatter all those fanciful playthings and gewgaws of art which poets loved so much; they will cut down my laurel groves and plant potatoes there; the lilies, which neither spun nor toiled, and yet were as gorgeously arrayed as Solomon in all his glory, will be uprooted from the soil of society, unless, forsooth, they take a spindle in hand; the roses, those lazy brides of the nightingales, will incur the same fate;

the nightingales, useless songsters, will be expelled: and ah! my "Book of Songs" will serve the grocer for paper bags to pour coffee or snuff into for the old women of the future. Nevertheless, I frankly acknowledge this same Communism, that is so opposed to all my interests and inclinations, exercises a spell on my soul from which I can not free myself; two voices in its favor rise in my breast, two voices that will not be silenced, which perhaps are after all only diabolical instigations; but, be that as it may, they master me, and no power of exorcism can overcome them. For the first of these voices is the voice of logic. "The devil is a logician," said Dante. A horrible syllogism entangles me, and if I can not refute the proposition "All men have a right to eat," then I am forced to submit to all its consequences. When I reflect on this, I run the risk of losing my senses; I see all the demons of truth dancing round me in triumph, and at last the high-souled despair of my heart seizes on me, and I cry out, "It is tried and condemned long since, this old society. Let it have its due! Let this old world be destroyed, in which innocence was overridden, in which selfishness prospered so famously, in which man was preyed upon by man! Let them be utterly overthrown, those whited sepulchers on which falsehood and flagrant injustice sat enthroned! And blessed be the grocer who will one day make bags out of my poetry to pour coffee or snuff into for the good, honest old women who in our present unjust world have to go without these luxuries. *Fiat justitia, pereat mundus!*" The second of the commanding voices that hold me prisoner is still more powerful and more devilish than the first, for it is the voice of hatred—of the hatred I bear to a party of which the greatest opponent is Communism, and which, therefore, is a common enemy of ours. I speak of the national party in Germany; those false patriots whose patriotism consists only in a stupid aversion to foreigners and neighboring nations, and who daily pour out their gall on France especially. All my life long have I loathed and combated them, and now that my sword is sinking from the grasp of a dying man, I feel comforted by the conviction that Communism, which will find them the first thing in its path, will give them the *coup de grâce;* and by no blow with a club assuredly, but by a simple kick the giant will crush them, as one crushes a wretched worm. That will be its first step. From hatred to the representatives of nationalism, I could almost feel affection for the Communists. At all events they are no hypocrites, with religion and Christianity constantly on their lips; the Communists in truth have no religion (nobody is perfect), the Communists are even atheists (which certainly is a great sin), but they acknowledge as chief dogma the most absolute cosmopolitism, a universal love for all peoples, an equality of possessions, and a brotherly relation of all men, the free citizens of this earth. This fundamental doctrine is the same as the Gospel once preached, so that in spirit and in truth the Communists are far more Christian than our so-called patriots, those narrow-minded champions of exclusive nationalism.

Heine hits on the Vendome Column as the first victim to Communistic fury, and speaks of M. Thiers in what now seems almost prophetic language:

The mind of M. Thiers overtops every intelligence around him, though there is more than one of lofty stature among them. He is the cleverest head in France, although it is reported he says so himself. He can speak from morning till midnight unweariedly, continually putting forth new, brilliant thoughts, flashes of intelligence, delighting, instructing, dazzling the hearers; fireworks, so to speak, of eloquence. And yet he conceives rather the material than the ideal requirements of mankind; he perceives not that last link by which earthly phenomena are attached to heaven; he has no understanding for great social institutions. In one of his recent speeches he owned, with almost simple candor, how little he trusted the immediate future, and how every day was a respite; he has a sharp ear, and already distinguishes the howling of the wolf Fenri, announcing the kingdom of Hela. Will despair at the inevitable not some day suddenly impel him to over-violent measures?

To add to these prophecies of thirty or forty years ago, one quite recent, it is worthy of mention that the distinguished physiological experimenter, Herr du Bois Reymond, rector of the University of Berlin, delivered last July a lecture on France and its weakness, in the closing paragraph of which he used the following remarkable language:

This war must end in the destruction of the second empire. Germany's safety absolutely requires this result. But this is not all. We trust the war will have another effect, namely, to cure France forever of its pretensions to domineer; of its insolence; of its rapacious instincts, or to sum it all in one word, of its *chauvinisme*. Doubtless it would have been better if the extinction of *chauvinisme* had been obtained without the effusion of blood; by the insensible progress of civilization; by the diffusion of public instruction; by civil and religious freedom. Fate has decided otherwise. If *chauvinisme* be incurable, if the French refuse to be cured, then one of these days all Europe will force on them the decisive cure the Anglo-Saxon on the other side of the Atlantic forces on the red man. Europe can not exterminate France as America may at last exterminate the red man. but it may happen that France is to be stifled in a still more terrible manner. It may happen that, like malefactors banished from civilized society, Frenchmen may in their despair turn their arms against each other, and that at the end of these sanguinary collisions the Gallo-Roman nation may follow Spain in the abyss where she has been shattered to atoms.

Before proceeding, it is perhaps proper to say that the method pursued by Comte, Heine, and others—especially by a writer in *The Modern Thinker*, who dealt with "Steam as a Factor in Sociology," and the "Future of Marriage," as well as by the writers of the works on our list—is entirely distinct from the guess-work of the past, either satirical or otherwise. The prophecies of Bishop Hall and Bishop Berkeley (if indeed he was the author of "Signor Gaudentio di Lucca"), "The Voyage to Liliput" of Swift, Sir Thomas More's "Utopia," and the many other similar works that will occur to the reader, were mere inspirations of the individual mind. That some of the predictions turned out as foretold is certain, but they were merely happy coincidences. The utopias thus formed are in the same category—they were intended to present an ideal state of existence, like nothing in earth or heaven. On the contrary, the new order of forecasts and utopias are founded upon observations. They follow out with more or less power the indications of past history as revealed in general physiological and sociological laws. And that they are not so misleading as is sometimes thought is certain from the general accuracy of the previsions of Heine and Comte with regard to the social future of France. Whatever be the merit of any or all of these attempts at social prognostication, there can be little question that only by their multiplication can any really extended knowledge of the political and social future come to us.

All the predictions so far dealt with have been serious and affirmative. There is, however, a negative and satirical variety of social forecast, a powerful specimen of which we have in the second piece upon our list, *Blackwood's* article upon "The Battle of Dorking." This can hardly be called a social utopia. It does not point out the inevitable; it merely makes a stirring appeal from a negative standpoint for action. It is the exact counterpart of the blast of the old prophets of Israel, and there can be little doubt that it will have more effect upon military reform and reorganization in England than any number of two-hour speeches from the Treasury or opposition benches, or any number of leaders in the "Thunderer." In one way this "Battle of Dorking" is satirical and pungent, but those who go to it to seek the pungent wit of Swift will lose their journey. In fact, the most noticeable thing about it is the entire

absence of partisanship. The author has an object, and it is apparent throughout; but like all earnest men he desires attainment of his object without much regard to the instruments by which it is accomplished.

The third article upon our list, *Fraser's* "Travels of a Philosopher in the Famous Empire of Hulee, A.D. 2071," forms a transition between the true forecast and the utopia. It is the latter, inasmuch as it tries to construct a race of men such as the author conceives the prevalence of the present materialistic and scientific tendencies of the age would really mold. It is a forecast, and a warning one, in the sense that it satirizes these tendencies unmercifully, thus preaching in trumpet tones the efficacy of the spiritualistic corner-stone so often rejected of science. To those interested in these philosophical disputes hardly anything more suggestive or stimulating has appeared in many a day than these "Travels." The portraiture of the Büchner, Mill, Spencer, Comte, and other schools more or less allied, incorrectly grouped under the single head of materialists and thus doing very great violence to their individual tenets, is evidently the product of a mind well acquainted with, yet still in a measure antagonistic to, them.

"The Coming Race" and "Anno Domini 2071" are, on the other hand, utopias pure and simple. They are clear and decided instances of the application of poetic imagination to politics, which has lately become so common as to be decidedly remarkable. The great thinker to whom frequent reference has been made above appears to have been one of the first to clearly perceive the true character of this artifice in sociological method. In 1848 he wrote thus:

> The application of poetry to social phenomena, which constitute the chief sphere both of art and science, is very imperfectly understood as yet, and can hardly be said to have begun, owing to the want of any true theory of society. The real object of so applying it is that it should regulate the formation of social utopias, subordinating them to the laws of social development as revealed by history. Utopias are to the art of social life what geometrical and mechanical types are to their respective arts. In these their necessity is universally recognized, and surely the necessity can not be less in problems of much greater intricacy. Accordingly we see that, notwithstanding the empirical condition in which political art has hitherto existed, every great change has been ushered in one or two centuries beforehand by a utopia bearing some analogy to it.—*Comte: "A General View of Positivism," translated by Dr. J. H. Bridges*, p. 303.
>
> The Positivist poet will naturally be led to form prophetic pictures of the regeneration of man, viewed in every aspect that admits of being ideally represented. Systematic formation of utopias will in fact become habitual, on the distinct understanding that, as in every other branch of art, the ideal shall be kept in subordination to the real. When it is once understood that the sphere of imagination is simply that of explaining and giving life to the conclusions of reason, the severest thinkers will welcome its influence, because so far from obscuring truth it will give greater distinctness to it than could be given by science unassisted. Utopias have, then, their legitimate purpose, and Positivism will strongly encourage their formation. They form a class of poetry which will prove of material service in giving a foretaste of the beauty and greatness of the new life that is now offered to the individual, to the family, and to society.—*Id.*, p. 335.

There can be no question that there is somewhat of a prejudice in the practical mind against these attempts. While the Platonic view of their structure and function was the only one systematically urged, it was right and proper that this prejudice should exist

and be fostered. But when the very contrary view of both was taken, when, as in the above extract, which faithfully represents the latest conception of their utility and scope, they are seen to represent but in concrete and living form the abstract and lifeless conclusions of reason, this prejudice becomes not only irrational but hurtful. The utopias now struck out take some general result of science, some tendencies at work in society, and follow them out to their legitimate logical conclusion. They picture man with his roots far back in the past, but as living under changed conditions, brought about by his conquests over nature, or over his own evil passions. The most conservative person can surely see nothing baneful in the attempt to forecast the alterations to be made in the structure of nations and even of mankind at large by the future extensions of steam and electrical communications by land and water. The same may be said for the utilization of the results of organic chemistry in the preparation of cheaper, more palatable, more easily transported, and, in a word, more suitable food for the human family and their assistants—the domestic animals. There is no use in following this subject further, as every intelligent reader will see at a glance that the applications of machinery to work now exclusively performed by manual labor, the researches now being made upon the growth of plants and animals under various artificial conditions of light and heat, the physiological inquiries upon the functions of the nervous system and the results of recent study upon the mental past of the race, not to speak of the late events which have occurred in this country and in Europe, would form topics of absorbing interest if worked up into the form of what, for want of a better name, must be called social utopias. The great error to be avoided in all these constructions, and one into which nearly all writers of them have fallen, is the belief that the future will be the exact prolongation of the past. As has been well said by a Saturday Reviewer:

> This doctrine may be described as prophecy made easy. That it is not an exhaustive or accurate account of the phenomena may indeed be easily demonstrated. If a similar dogma had prevailed, for example, just before the appearance of Christianity, it would have led to deceptive conclusions. The gradual spread of the Roman empire over the whole world would have been one inference, and another might have been the simple disappearance of all genuine religious belief. What really happened could have suggested itself to no one. In the same way, if we select properly the standing point of the prophet, we might make the gradual triumph of the Papacy, or the conquest of Europe by Mohammedanism, or the universal rule of France or of Spain, appear to be among the inevitable events of the future. It would be easy to suggest any number of cases in which a particular intellectual or social change seemed to be destined to the conquest of the whole earth. Dynasties and doctrines have periods of development, culmination, and decay; and if you select any part of the ascending period, the simple formula we are discussing would, of course, imply that they are destined to unlimited triumph. People who attempt to look forward generally forget this obvious teaching of past experience. They assume, for example, as an ultimate and indisputable fact, that we shall continue to become more and more democratic. We do not mean to assert the contrary, but it is hard to see on what grounds this doctrine can be so confidently maintained. Why should there not come a period at which the democratic forces will, in American language, be "played out," and society be reconstructed on some new principle? We seem already, in some respects, to have gotten to the bottom of the hill, and it is difficult to see how we are to get much farther. When the social service has been thoroughly

reduced to one dead level, is it not probable that a new order of distinctions will begin to make themselves manifest, and that reconstruction of which we hear so much and see so little will at last become palpable? A new process of crystallization should follow the complete decomposition; and it would be much more interesting if the creators of fresh utopias could throw light upon the new order of things which is to emerge from chaos at some distant period, instead of simply following out the tendencies of the day to what is supposed to be their logical conclusion.

Perhaps the only utopia ever worked out in the spirit which this thoughtful writer recommends is the most stupendous specimen of the class—the "Système de Politique Positive"—and it seems as if this very fact that it works out a future in certain parts unlike the past may form its future fame, while it now deters ordinary readers from its perusal because of its assumed chimerical character. Comte's Utopia is, in another respect, a great improvement upon any of those now under review, inasmuch as it endeavors to make out the moral and esthetic future of the race as well as its merely scientific and material future. Just in this point are "The Coming Race," and "2071" weak. Neither believes that there will be any moral and esthetic improvement brought about by the advancement of learning, but rather a retrogradation in both. Let us hope such a future as that will not be realized.

In glancing into any of the present race of utopias or forecasts two things in addition to those pointed out before are apt to strike the attention of the attentive reader—the entire absence of supernatural machinery of any kind, and the necessary continuity of the structures with some at least of those now in existence or which existed in the past. In the present usage of words "The Apocalypse" of John would seem a veritable utopia, but it has little or nothing to do with this world; it proposes a rest for the weary after death. The same may be said of St. Augustine's "De Civitate Dei," which, as its author was a great logician, is closely reasoned, but is little applicable to human wants upon this terrestrial ball. Turning to the work of one of the great thinkers of all time, Plato, who was certainly little tinctured with supernaturalism, it is apparent upon even a cursory examination of "The Republic" and "The Laws" that this giant proposed to build his model community out of men with hopes and fears molded by and inherited from the past, and yet he intended to start out with small cognizance of this same past. Whatever may be said of the former tendency, the latter was certainly a mistake. One of the later note-worthy attempts to construct such a mythical community was that of Rousseau in the last century with his *contrat social*, savages without vices and a great abstraction, Nature. Supernatural utopias have certainly gone out of fashion. So deeply are men centred in earth and its work that they find little time and less inclination to go beyond, and are rather willing to trust to an unknown hereafter if they have acted well their part here.

In closing this long and rather rambling discussion of a very interesting subject—that of predictions more or less accurate (none of them can be entirely so) of the social future—it will not be out of place to say that readers of the works upon our list, and for that

matter those who wish to follow up the indications here given, may expect to find an atmosphere very bracing to healthy lungs. Such works are as good as any stimulants to be found in current literature. They open up new tracks for thought, point to what may be in part, and prepare the way for it.

E.

THE DUTIES OF WEALTH.

Mr. Peter Cooper, in an address delivered at the Cooper Union, on May 31st, 1871, expressed so concisely, and yet fully, the Positivist doctrine touching the duties of wealth, that I reproduce his words here:

But, having also acquired what is regarded as riches, if the use I have made of them renders it proper for me to give any advice or speak a word of encouragement to others who, by the will of God, are intrusted with the great responsibility of wealth, I feel impelled to record my conviction, derived from personal experience, *that the rich man who regards his wealth as a sacred trust to be used for the welfare of his fellow-men*, will surely derive more true enjoyment from it in this world than from the most lavish expenditure on mere personal enjoyments and social display. I do not pretend to prescribe any standard of expenditure for others; and I am quite ready to subscribe to the doctrine, that a just and faithful trustee should be liberally paid for his services, and should not be restricted in the reasonable gratification of his desires so long as the rights of others are not thereby infringed; and I desire to give the fullest recognition to the sacredness of private property and the conservation of capital, as for the best interests of society and all the members thereof; *but I can not shut my eyes to the fact that the production of wealth is not the work of any one man, and the acquisition of great fortunes is not possible without the co-operation of multitudes of men; and that, therefore, the individuals to whose lot these fortunes fall, whether by inheritance or the laws of production and trade, should never lose sight of the fact, that as they only hold them by the will of society, expressed in statute law, so they should administer them as trustees for the benefit of society, as inculcated by the moral law.*

When rich men are thus brought to regard themselves as trustees, and poor men learn to be industrious, economical, temperate, self-denying, and diligent in the acquisition of knowledge, then the deplorable strife between capital and labor tending to destroy their fundamental, necessary, and irrefragable harmony will cease, and the world will no longer be afflicted with such unnatural industrial conflicts as we have seen during the past century in every quarter of the civilized globe, and latterly on so great a scale in this country, arraying those whom Nature intended to be firm allies and inseparable friends, into hostile camps in which the great law of love and mutual forbearance is extinguished by selfish passions.

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